

FERENCZI'S DANGEROUS PROXIMITIES: TELEPATHY, PSYCHOSIS, AND THE REAL EVENT.

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In the abridged version of the *Freud/Jung Letters*, the first mention of the analyst Sandor Ferenczi refers the reader to the following footnote: “Sandor Ferenczi (1873–1933), Hungarian ventriloquist; introduced by Jung, he became Freud’s close friend and psychoanalytic collaborator” (McGuire, ed. 123). Since there is no evidence to suggest that Ferenczi was ever employed as a ventriloquist, or that he even practiced puppetry as an identity-defining hobby, it seems likely that the footnote is simply a joke at Ferenczi’s expense. Unlike some other early analysts, Ferenczi was never one of Freud’s puppets. He stirred up far too much trouble. However, the title of Ferenczi’s final paper, “Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child,” suggests that the label ventriloquist might adhere to him for another reason. Contra Freud, Ferenczi’s late theories and practice radically problematize the question of whose desires speak through the subject. In “Confusion of Tongues,” Ferenczi returns to Freud’s early ideas about the traumatic effects of childhood sexual abuse to insist that the child’s material experience of abuse and invasion could result in her identifying with, introjecting, and even speaking in the voice of, the attacking adult. This confusion over who speaks results from a confusion over where tongues literally are: in whose mouths, in relation to whose bodies.

Ferenczi’s final thoughts on psychic and physical invasion have been read as the ghost story of psychoanalysis. Detractors of Freud, such as Jeffrey Masson, have resurrected Ferenczi as the unsung hero of the seduction theory -the analyst who dared to speak the truth about the frequency of child abuse, and whose work was finally suppressed for its apostasy. But if this is one version of a ghost story of psychoanalysis, it is not the only one. The occult’s incompletely excavated place in the history of psychoanalysis may lead to other ghosts, and more interesting connections between fantasy, history, and the individual psyche, than Masson’s reading of Freud’s “assault on truth.” (The title of Masson’s book indicates his absolute certainty about both what constitutes assault and what constitutes truth.) Masson’s version of psychoanalysis’s relationship to the “real event” oversimplifies both Freud’s and Ferenczi’s engagement with the seduction theory. Contrary to Masson’s assertions, Freud does not suggest that child abuse does not occur; rather he argues that real occurrences are not the only possible trigger for fantasized relations. Violent, invasive relations occur in fantasy as well as in reality, and the psyche cannot automatically distinguish between these two realms. Freud never discards the structure and logic of the seduction theory, which he returns to again and again.¹ Nor does he ever deny the reality of child abuse. But psychoanalysis, as Freud conceives it, concerns itself with the realm of fantasy. Events may happen, or they may not, but fantasized relations to these events and non-events always do happen, and it is in this realm of relations that the work of psychoanalysis takes place.

Ferenczi’s psychoanalytic work, like Freud’s, relies on this reworking of the seduction theory through fantasy. However, by the end of his life, in his *Clinical Diary* and in his radical practices, Ferenczi, more so than Freud, seems drawn towards the inextricability of fantasy and a brute, material reality. Ferenczi’s practices push at the borders of psychoanalysis; he is willing, even eager, to dispute the separation between practice and theory, the personal and the professional, and the psychic and the physical. His writings tell a series of disturbing and provocative stories about the contingent outside world and the psyche’s functioning to process it, stories that have helped foster a critical unease about Ferenczi’s place within the institutional history of psychoanalysis.

A comprehensive explanation of Ferenczi's comparative neglect in the history of psychoanalysis would involve an understanding of the anxieties (both theoretical and personal) his experiments in the interpenetration of the theoretical and the personal raised, for other analysts, and for the institution of analysis. What has been described as a systematic character assassination of Ferenczi began with Ernest Jones's biography of Freud. As Martin Stanton puts it in his book about Ferenczi, "[t]he circulation of pernicious rumors that Ferenczi was deranged and seduced his patients hardly encouraged serious study of his work"⁽¹⁾². Here I want to argue that Ferenczi's most innovative technical and theoretical speculations are inseparable from the fact that he was "deranged" and seduced his patients. Or, to be more temperate, Ferenczi's active technique, in which the analyst may actually take on the roles his patient suggests, to the extent of giving the patient the physical affection that he or she craves, grew out of his desire to reach his most seriously disturbed patients. Similarly, what Jones saw as Ferenczi's psychosis -for instance, his belief "that he was being successfully psychoanalyzed by messages transmitted telepathically across the Atlantic from an ex-patient of his"- was connected to this same desire to break down mental and physical barriers (3: 407).

Ferenczi was fascinated by the occult for the very reason that it might contribute to an understanding of psychoanalysis's own mysterious and intimate transmissions. He went to mediums, gave lectures on thought transference, and even planned a book on it.³ For Ferenczi, thought transference made fantasy sharable, material, objective. It helped bring him back around to the seduction theory at the end of his life because of the questions of intimacy in analysis; the ways in which models of physical invasion of children by abusive parents could shed light on the potentially unbearable nature of psychoanalytic intimacy.

Freud's attempts to keep psychoanalysis's boundaries distinct from those of the occult have been well documented.⁴ One reason for Freud's concern is that psychoanalysis's ostensible object, sexuality, is not easily and obviously understood under the new terms for it that psychoanalysis proposes. No longer viewed as a biological drive, in psychoanalysis, desire emerges from a complicated layering of infantile experiences, memories, scenes, and structures. Sexuality becomes the primary source of the psychological disorders that create uncanny effects in the subjects who are governed, and produced, by desire. In its effects, desire resembles the demonic. As Adam Phillips claims, "in psychoanalysis the supernatural returns as the erotic" (19). As Freud's and Ferenczi's interest in thought transference and the potentially invasive nature of others' minds and bodies attests, what the supernatural and the erotic have in common is the ways in which fears, anxieties, desires -the meat and potatoes of psychoanalysis- emerge from questions of proximity and distance. Are the dead ineradicably distant/other to us? Or can they invade our very selves? What if they speak through us? What if other living minds are closer to us than we like to think; what if they too invade us? What if we are sexually invaded, if our bodily boundaries are violated at an early age, or what if we fantasize about this taking place? *How close is too close?*

In this article, I will investigate several interrelated aspects of Freud's and Ferenczi's fraught engagement with the idea of material transmission, focusing first on the possibility of thought transference, what Freud refers to at one point as "the physical equivalent of the psychical act." Freud's correspondence with Ferenczi, and the *Clinical Diary* Ferenczi kept in the final years of his life indicate that Ferenczi's interest in telepathy and mediums, his overt transference desire for Freud, and his turn back to the seduction theory are all aspects of a fascination with dangerous intimacy -bodies and minds that overlap in ways that are too close, too inextricable. Ferenczi's work brings certain themes that have been seen as anxiety-provoking for Freudian psychoanalysis -thought transference, psychosis, homosexuality, and the seduction theory- to the forefront. He embodies the ways in which psychoanalysis cannot leave the occult behind.

Freud's volatile relationship with telepathy, a systematic wavering between embracing it and refusing it, covers most of his career. The skeptical Ernest Jones devotes one chapter of his biography of Freud to "Occultism" and is forced to admit the master's fascination with the topic. In anxious letters to Freud, Jones reiterates his own desire to keep psychoanalysis as far away from the occult as possible. Freud replies in a letter of 7 Mar. 1926: "If someone should reproach you with my Fall into Sin, you are free to reply that my adherence to telepathy is my private affair like my Jewishness, my passion for smoking, and other things, and the theme of telepathy -inessential for psychoanalysis" (qtd. in Gay 445).

I will leave aside the intriguing question of just how private Jewishness and smoking are in relation to psychoanalysis in order to further explore Freud's differing reactions to telepathy.⁵ When Ferenczi reports that he has been experimenting with thought transference by correctly guessing strangers' names on buses, Freud responds that he cannot go along with Ferenczi's and Jung's "dangerous expeditions" into the realm of mysticism, although he is apparently not too perturbed by their desire to experiment (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 11 May 1911, Letter 216, 273–74). In the mode of indulgent mentor, Freud signs off, "Regards to you, uncanny one" (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 11 May 1911, Letter 216, 274). Generally Freud remains cautious of anything that could associate psychoanalysis with occultism. In his memoir, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung indicates that Freud's fear of the occult sometimes verged on the histrionic. Jung writes:

I can still recall vividly how Freud said to me, "My dear Jung, promise me never to abandon the sexual theory. This is the most essential thing of all. You see, we must make a dogma of it, an unshakable bulwark." He said that to me with great emotion.

... In some astonishment I asked him, "A bulwark—against what?" To which he replied "Against the black tide of mud", -and here he hesitated for a moment, then added- "of occultism." (qtd. in Kerr 317–18)

The muddying incursion of occult knowledge into psychoanalysis would make it difficult to see psychoanalysis as a science, something that cures through a proven and repeatable methodology -the discovery of repressed sexuality, the removal of symptoms, etc.- rather than through a mystical faith in a healer-analyst. If analysts were mind-readers, then, as François Roustang has pointed out, the transference would never end.⁶ The analyst as subject who, in Lacanian terminology, is supposed to know, would really know, and the patient would be caught in a psychotic bind in which the analyst would dictate the patient's terms.

In their correspondence Freud and Ferenczi discuss in detail the mediums Ferenczi has been seeing. Of the medium Frau Seidler, Freud says:

I also cannot exclude the probability that she can do something, namely, reproduce your thoughts, whose visual representation in her mind she herself does not understand. All other explanations, like enhanced sensitivity for mimicry and the like, seem to me first of all inadequate, and second, they presuppose a special psychic ability in this woman. The assumption of thought transference alone does not require this but rather the opposite; she may be quite an imbecilic, even inactive person who makes images of what would otherwise be suppressed through her own intellectual activity. In her intention to swindle and to play the magician, she then has the courage and the attentiveness to perceive what has come into being purely physiologically in her.

. . . Should one now, as a result of this experience, commit oneself to occultism? Certainly not; it is only a matter of thought transference. If this can be proved, then one has to believe it— then it is not [a psychoanalytic] phenomenon, but rather a purely somatic one, certainly a novelty of the first rank. In the meantime, let us keep absolute silence with regard to it. (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 11 Oct. 1909, Letter 75, 80–81)

In this passage, Freud carefully distinguishes thought transference from more occult powers such as prophecy, and then distinguishes thought transference from psychoanalysis by making it a purely physiological phenomenon. He suggests that some people may be particularly sensitive to others' thoughts and capable of the immediate somatic process of thought transference because they have empty minds that can pick up on, and not distort, the images of others by an unfortunate turn for interpretation. For Freud, thought transference is definitely not a psychoanalytic phenomenon, but its content can be analyzed through psychoanalytic methods. Like dreams and fantasies, transferred thoughts require psychoanalytic interpretation to be properly understood. Freud can interpret the information that the thought transferring

fortune-teller receives because he can read (psychoanalytically), while the fortune-teller is simply an illiterate medium.

Jung's dangerous occultism threatened to lead toward one problem for psychoanalysis -that of the all-knowing prophetic analyst. But Freud's somatic explanations of telepathy may be covering up another difficulty -the apparent similarity between psychoanalytic transference and thought transference. Freud's insistence upon the physiological nature of thought transference should distinguish it from psychoanalytic transference. Psychoanalytic transference -the keystone of the psychoanalytic method- takes place through the inevitable substitution of objects. The patient responds to the analyst (and others) with emotions and reactions that refer back to earlier stages of the patient's life, and that were aimed originally towards other people. But both psychoanalytic transference and thought transference depend on the potential separability of thought from thinker, and of emotion from the object that it is directed towards; both kinds of transference bring up questions about the mysterious nature of the transmissibility of psychic life: "The telepathic question par excellence, one which immediately reveals its kinship to psychoanalysis is: 'Whose thoughts are these, inhabiting my inner world?'" (Forrester, "Psychoanalysis" 252). Freudian psychoanalysis attempts to answer this question by working within and through the transferences between analyst and patient, a process that involves both interpretation and affective immediacy, recalled memory and re-lived emotions. By contrast, professional telepaths, according to Freud, work only with physiological responses. They may be a "novelty of the first rank", but no more.

Yet this physiological novelty appears to hold a particular fascination for Freud. When he allows himself to speculate on the existence of telepathy at the end of "Dreams and Occultism," his interest in the physical explanation of the phenomenon comes to the forefront:

The telepathic process is supposed to consist in a mental act in one person instigating the same mental act in another person. What lies between these two mental acts may easily be a physical process into which the mental one is transformed at one end and which is transformed back once more into the same mental one at the other end. The analogy with other transformations, such as occur in speaking and hearing by telephone, would then be unmistakable. And only think if one could get hold of this physical equivalent of the psychical act! It would seem to me that psychoanalysis, by inserting the unconscious between what is physical and what was previously considered "psychical," has paved the way for the assumption of such processes as telepathy.

... It is a familiar fact that we do not know how the common purpose comes about in the great insect communities: possibly it is done by means of a direct psychical transference of this kind.

One is led to a suspicion that this is the original, archaic method of communication between individuals and that in the course of phylogenetic evolution it has been replaced by the better method of giving information with the help of signals which are picked up by the sense organs. But the older method might have persisted in the background and still be able to put itself into effect under certain conditions—for instance, in passionately excited mobs. (New Introductory 55)

Telepathy appeals to Freud in this passage as a mechanism of transmission that refers back towards an original, archaic communication -language as inseparable from biology. For Freud, as for other theorizers of telepathy at the turn of the century, modern examples of thought transference were atavistic remnants from an earlier evolutionary state (Oppenheim 147). When Freud enthusiastically imagines getting hold of the "physical equivalent of the psychical act," he imagines a physical precursor to representation. The material transformations of the telephone and the mysterious communication methods of insects provide him with comparisons on which to ground his speculations.

In this passage, both telepathy and the unconscious are defined as formations that exist somewhere between the physical and what once was labeled the psychical -the uncanny world of ghosts and possession. But this space between the physical and the psychical is a difficult space to define. When Freud rejected

biologically determinist explanations for the origins of neurosis and hysteria, he found himself exploring various ways to explain transmission (of mental illness, but also of sexuality, of the inner psychic life of the parents to the inner psychic life of the children, of history, etc.). One possibility his clinical practice led him towards was that of a shared evolutionary inheritance of humanity -a storehouse of primal memories.

Freud's conception of humanity's evolutionary history and prehistory shares with Lamarckian evolutionary theory a belief in the inheritance of acquired traits. In Freud's phylogenetic schemas an ancestor witnesses or participates in a scene -such as the primal murder- and that scene is then mysteriously passed down through the generations. As Martin Stanton maintains:

The problematic relationship between biological and psychological "origins" has therefore generated a hybrid narrative space in psychoanalysis. Laplanche and Pontalis have drawn attention to the peculiar "middle ground" occupied by scenes that are supposed to transcribe the biological development of the species in the cultural development of the individual: the primal scene, the seduction scene, the castration scene and the return to the mother's breast. Clearly it is the status of fantasy in these that render their "reality" problematic. (77)

It is the uncertain reality of inherited scenes that grounds the subject's sexuality (the primal scene) and morality and socialization (the primal murder). In "The Wolfman" and in his *Introductory Lectures*, Freud tentatively endorses a phylogenetic bedrock to fantasy:

It seems to me quite possible that all the things that are told to us today in analysis as phantasy—the seduction of children, the inflaming of sexual excitement by observing parental intercourse, the threat of castration (or rather castration itself)—were once real occurrences in the primaevial times of the human family, and that children in their fantasies are simply filling in the gaps in individual truth with prehistoric truths. (Introductory 371)⁷

This Lamarckian psychic inheritance of an ancestor's real action is something like the insertion of the ghostly into the social. An event happens in archaic time which is then inherited and installed in the psychic structure of the human race.

Freud's and Ferenczi's investment in thought transference is related in complex ways to their mutual fascination with Lamarck. They began planning a book on Lamarck together in 1917:

Our intention is to place Lamarck entirely on our basis and to show that his "need" which creates and transforms organs is nothing other than the power of unconscious ideas over the body, of which we see relics in Hysteria; in short, the "omnipotence of thoughts." Purpose and usefulness would then be explained psychoanalytically; it would be the completion of psychoanalysis.⁸

"Need" (*besoin*) was Lamarck's term for the stimulus for evolutionary change and adaptation in animals: "The drive to adapt was so strong that animals responded automatically to stimuli from the outside world, and from inside their own bodies, like thirst or hunger" (Jordanova 81). There are two elements of Lamarckian thought that particularly intrigue Freud and Ferenczi -one is the inheritance of acquired traits, already discussed; the other is this somewhat opaque idea of "need," a term that is already in Lamarck's terminology caught somewhere between conscious desire and automatic response.⁹ It is clear why the readings (and misreadings) of Lamarck's "need" might resonate with psychoanalytic ideas. All of Freud's early work with hysterics indicated that the unconscious mind worked upon the body to create physical symptoms. One of Freud's most radical moves was to collapse any easy distinction between the physical and the psychical. For psychoanalysis, desire can indeed transform the body, the world, reality.

If in the quotation given above, Freud and Ferenczi seem initially intent on explaining Lamarck psychoanalytically by subsuming Lamarck's evolutionary theory into their psychoanalytic one, then the reference to hysterical symptoms as "relics" serves to indicate the persistence of a Lamarckian phylogenetic residue built into the very structure of psychoanalytic theories of transmission. Hysterical symptoms signify the power of unconscious thought over the body and gesture towards an atavistic reemergence of primitive, imprinted traits -for Freud, those prehistoric moments when primal scenes of desire became embedded in the human psyche in a transmissible way. It is in this imprinting that biology seems to beckon towards Freud once again, but then psychoanalysis also beckons towards biology, suggesting that what is sometimes imagined as the purely physiological is never immune from the transference dynamics of history and the psyche.

What is at stake in these knotted questions about the theorization of transmission in psychoanalysis? In one sense, simply more than I can begin to approach in the space of one article, even if I thought that I could do justice to the topic. But I do want to suggest that Freud's enthusiastic speculations about thought transference at the end of "Dreams and Occultism" are related to his desire to write a book on Lamarck. Lamarck, and his interpreters (and misinterpreters), provides Freud with a theory of transformation that imbues the material with a kind of psychic volition and allows for the inheritance of acquired history. In his speculations in "Dreams and Occultism," Freud pictures thought transference as a mechanism of transmission that can negotiate that fraught arena with which psychoanalysis is so centrally concerned, in which the material, the psychic, and the historical are interwoven.

Laplanche and Pontalis have indicated how Freud's movement from phylogeny to ontogeny -from prehistoric reality to psychological reality- can be read as a prefiguration of Lacan's Symbolic order. What endures as psychical reality are the structures of fantasy that are universal, such as the Oedipal structure that grounds the Symbolic (Laplanche and Pontalis 17). Freud's wish to "get hold" of the physical equivalent of the psychical act opens up the possibility for understanding language itself as a phylogenetic inheritance -a structure developed at some originary, prehistoric point and passed mysteriously from generation to generation. Shared structures of fantasy create the possibility of thought transference, because we all, within a given culture, inherit the same structural forms. Lacan speculates that the transference effects of analysis, and the symbolic coincidences that Freud labels telepathy, appear because of these shared structures: "it is through being links, supports, rings in the same circle of discourse that the subjects simultaneously experience such and such a symptomatic act, or discover such and such a memory" (89).¹⁰

Agents integrated in the same circle of discourse can find themselves symbolically bound, sharing a limited number of thoughts, and perhaps inevitably, squabbling over the territory. It is perhaps not too surprising that the history of psychoanalysis reveals an excessive concern for questions of originality and plagiarism. As François Roustang has shown, the rivalrous relationships between Freud's followers replicate Freud's own theories of the primal horde.¹¹ Freud, the father, is always finally the hated, feared, and desired original source of psychoanalytic theory. Anyone who seems to come upon psychoanalytic ideas along with, or in advance of, Freud threatens his position. Although he repeatedly disavows the desire to be original, Freud also claims that he avoids reading Nietzsche because he is afraid that Nietzsche might have prefigured his own ideas ("Autobiographical Study" 60). Freud seems more than a little anxious about questions of priority, yet he warns George Groddeck off of "the trivial ambition of claiming originality and priority... Could you have absorbed the main idea of psychoanalysis in a cryptomnesic way? In a way similar to my discoveries relating to my own originality? What's the use of struggling for priorities against an older generation" (Groddeck 37)? One might ask what sort of self-blinded question is this from the man who discovered the Oedipus complex? Freud suggests that we always struggle against an older generation, killing the father and taking his ideas for our own, in order to carve out a mythical individuality in a shared and crowded terrain. Cryptomnesia allows us to believe the myth of our own originality by forgetting selectively. But of course the unconscious always knows the truth -that we inevitably borrow and steal. Working through the same psychic material we tread the same paths, fall into the same traps. Freud and his analytic followers systematically uncover and repress this repetitive schema. In her autobiography Helene Deutsch helpfully points out that even her anxieties of influence are not her own: "Thus I became interested

at one time in the problems of plagiarism, only to learn much later that these had once weighed very heavily on Freud” (Deutsch 150). What emerges from these early analytic disputes is a series of mistaken, often comic, and sometimes tragic encounters around suggestibility and ownership of thought in psychoanalysis.

The landscape of permeable minds that thought transference suggests can seem like a psychotic staging of these charged negotiations between Freud and his followers. One key dispute occurs between Freud and Ferenczi on a trip they take to Palermo. Bad feelings erupt when the two attempt to collaborate on an article about the psychotic judge, Daniel Paul Schreber. Ferenczi later described the incident:

[Freud] was too big for me, too much of a father. The result was that in Palermo, where he wanted to do the famous work on paranoia (Schreber) in collaboration with me, right on the first evening of work when he wanted to dictate something to me, I rose up in a sudden burst of rebellion and explained that it was not at all a collaboration, if he simply dictated to me. “So that’s the way you are?”—he said, astonished. “You perhaps wanted to take the whole thing?” Having said that, he worked alone every evening from then on. (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 28 Sep. 1910, Letter 168, 214–15; footnote quoting Ferenczi/Groddeck 24 Dec. 1921)

Ferenczi, refusing to be dictated to, stages a secretarial rebellion that Schreber himself would recognize. Schreber’s delusions literally enact the dangers of suggestion, thought transference, and the taking of dictation in the form of catastrophes upon his body and mind. Compulsively forced to think thoughts that are not his, he is invaded by foreign interlocutors (talking birds, rays made out of language) and believes himself to be the focus of an elaborate dictation plot. All of the words he utters and thinks are recorded by lackeys who send down rays saying “we have already got this” when he dares to repeat a thought (Schreber 122).

When Freud finally writes up his solely authored treatise on Schreber, he finds himself embroiled in another plagiarism/identification problem. Schreber’s ideas resemble his own a little too closely:

Schreber’s “rays of God,” which are made up of a condensation of the sun’s rays, of nerve-fibres, and of spermatozoa . . . are in reality nothing else than a concrete representation and projection outwards of libidinal cathexes; and they thus lend his delusions a striking conformity with our theory. . . . I can nevertheless call a friend and fellow-specialist to witness that I had developed my theory of paranoia before I became acquainted with the contents of Schreber’s book. (Freud, SE 12: 78–79)

Schreber’s delusional system “concretely” enacts Freud’s theories of paranoid libidinal processes. Freud, analyzing the paranoid ideas of the psychotic judge, finds himself pleased by Schreber’s conceptual conformity with his own ideas of libidinal cathexes. The difference between Schreber and Freud should be that the psychotic, Schreber, lives *through* his delusional systems while the doctor, Freud, analyzes them. However, in this passage, Freud appears to compete with Schreber as theorist, foregrounding his own paranoia by calling on a friend and fellow specialist to testify to his priority and independence over the already persecuted madman Schreber. Not surprisingly, this friend and fellow specialist turns out to be the mortified secretary Ferenczi.¹² In the midst of analyzing paranoid delusions of grandeur and uniqueness Freud still defends his priority as the source of ideas. If he is not himself Schreber, then he is in the position of the rays saying “we already have that one.”

As is evident in Schreber, psychosis is a disease that depends on magical and material forms of psychic transmission. Psychotics believe that the contents of their minds are being manipulated by outsiders -in one sense they are the ultimate victims of thought transference. Psychosis is an annihilating invasion by the other, an unassimilable symbolic attack that creates and destroys the subject in its wake. Psychotics, François Roustang argues, are incapable of entering the transferential contract of psychoanalysis because they themselves are nothing but what has been transferred. As we have seen, Freud wants to set up a clear distinction between thought transference and psychoanalytic transference; the first, if it exists, is an entirely

physiological phenomenon; the second happens psychically, in analysis and out of it, through unconscious representations and substitutions. But, as we have seen, this distinction is sometimes a difficult one to maintain because of that psychoanalytic merging of the physiological and the psychic. Freud finds himself drawn towards the thought transferences of the psychotic in his most speculative moments, imagining it as a mechanism that reflects a primitive material form of communication.

Theoretically, Freud is capable of admiring elements of psychotic thought -finding Schreber's delusions reassuringly supportive of his own theories- but in his practice he distances himself both from psychotics and the suggestive and annihilating forms of transmission they embody.¹³ On the other hand Ferenczi -the "deranged," seducing Ferenczi- collapses theory and practice, embraces annihilating forms of transmission, and redesigns psychoanalysis on the order of a psychosis. In the process, he imagines a road not taken for psychoanalysis.

In contrast to Freud, Ferenczi's fascination with thought transference both influences, and is influenced by, his psychoanalytic theory and practice. Ferenczi not only engages his patients in telepathy experiments, but also begins to believe that unconscious thought transference is inevitably an integral part of psychoanalysis. Ferenczi's interest in telepathy merges with his psychoanalytic practice through his belief in what he calls the "dialogue of the unconscious," which can develop between analyst and analysand, or between two people who are intimate, where: "the unconscious of two people completely understand themselves and each other, without the remotest conception of this on the part of the consciousness of either" (Ferenczi, "Psychogenic Anomalies" 109). As an outgrowth of this mutual communication already inherent in analysis, Ferenczi finds himself stretching the limits of transference by engaging in mutual analysis with some of his most severely disturbed patients. Mutual analysis began with Ferenczi's sense that if he disliked or felt uncomfortable with a patient, the patient could pick up on these feelings and it would impair the analytic work. Therefore, the analyst might occasionally find it necessary to be absolutely open with the patient, to let the patient understand his own resistances. In mutual analysis, the analyst and patient actually change places in order to work through the resistances on both sides that are blocking the analysis.

Ferenczi stresses that mutual analysis is a final resort rather than a recommended method. There are obvious problems with it. For instance, if Ferenczi confessed his personal secrets to his patients, they in turn could tell his secrets to others¹⁴:

Thus I would be confronted with the possibility that people who are complete strangers to me will come into full possession of my most intimate, most personal emotions, sins, etc. Consequently I either have to learn to accept the impossibility, even madness, of this whole idea and technique, or I must go on with this daring enterprise and come around to the idea that it really does not matter if a small group of people is formed whose members know everything about one another. (Ferenczi, Clinical 74)

As we will see in his correspondence with Freud, this vision of mutual mind-reading, a virtually psychotic society, becomes part of Ferenczi's ideal of a world changed by psychoanalysis through an open circuit of shared thought and shared honesty.

On 22 November 1910, Ferenczi writes to Freud, "Interesting news in the transference story. Imagine, I am a great soothsayer, that is to say, a reader of thoughts! I am reading my patients' thoughts (in my free associations). The future methodology of [psychoanalysis] must make use of this." Ferenczi goes on to describe his somewhat successful thought transference experiments with a homosexual patient. He concludes: "this method will be suitable to catch the patient's most active complexes at work. -It can be refined even more! When I come to Vienna I will introduce myself as 'court astrologer of the psychoanalysts'" (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 22 Nov. 1910, Letter 182, 235-36). One may wonder what the patient felt about using up his psychoanalytic hour on telepathy experiments, but Ferenczi's tone, a mixture of triumph and self-deprecating humor, indicates that he at the very least thought that this was a worthwhile use of analytic space, even if he was not sure how Freud might react.

Freud's following letter, written the next day but clearly before he received Ferenczi's news, is not concerned with thought transference, but rather with another difficult set of questions about the permeability and boundaries of the psyche. As previously discussed, Freud and Ferenczi had attempted, unsuccessfully, to collaborate on the work on Schreber. In November of 1910, Freud foresees the publication of his (now solely authored) work on Schreber and suggests that Ferenczi should publish his own article on paranoia before Freud's comes out because "after that you will lose the effect" (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 15 Nov. 1910, Letter 179, 233). When Freud writes to Ferenczi the day after Ferenczi's delighted, if somewhat tongue-in-cheek claims for himself as a mind reader, Freud says, not at all tongue-in-cheek: "As regards paranoia, it would be better for you to make yourself independent of me" (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 23 Nov. 1910, Letter 183, 236). It is a short, bitter letter complaining of Adler and Stekel's defections and ending: "I tell you, it was often nicer when I was alone" (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 23 Nov. 1910, Letter 183, 236). The simultaneity of Ferenczi's and Freud's crossing letters points toward the competing affective claims of thought transference and solitude. Ferenczi's exuberant attempts to bring thought transference to bear as a psychoanalytic tool suggests that he believes the analysts most telepathically attuned to their patient's unconscious will be the best ones. Thought transference for Ferenczi is a method that can and should be refined for analytic use, like free association and dream interpretation.

The contexts of these two letters differ; Freud's depression about theoretical disputes with colleagues is not precisely equivalent to Ferenczi's enthusiasm for telepathic contact with patients. Yet Freud's emphasis on shutting down the possibility of sharing thought contrasts strikingly with Ferenczi's tone. When Freud advises Ferenczi to make himself independent of Freud's thoughts, he is giving him an impossible order, because the institution of psychoanalysis, as well as Freud's theory of psychosis, is based on the recognition of the impossibility of keeping one's thoughts to oneself, and the impossibility of keeping one's thoughts from Freud. The order Freud gives Ferenczi resembles the impossible imperative the father bequeaths the Oedipal son: be like me/do not be like me. The structure of shared knowledge in psychoanalysis suggests that none of its early adherents were allowed to make themselves independent from Freud and still consider themselves psychoanalysts. All knowledge had to be traced back to its source/father Freud. Making oneself independent is just what Ferenczi cannot do with respect to Freud, and it is also what the structure of paranoid psychosis both desires and claims is impossible. The paranoid psychotic such as Schreber believes he stands alone in his central importance to the world order, but therefore his mind is subject to invasion, his thoughts are expropriated, his psyche is not his own.

After their failed attempt to collaborate on Schreber, Ferenczi sends Freud a soul-searching letter about his own wish for unimpeded access to Freud: "I did, perhaps, have an exaggerated idea of companionship between two men who tell each other the truth *unrelentingly*, sacrificing all consideration" (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 3 Oct. 1910, Letter 170, 217–18). Ferenczi's utopian ideal is one of thought transference as a two-way street, a shared emotional and intellectual storehouse; Freud's fears are of losing control of his own ideas. But as Ferenczi also points out, Freud's positioning of him as simply a medium or transcriber of Freud's ideas foregrounds one of the contradictory ways in which Ferenczi sees himself in relation to Freud -he sees his own thought as simply an outgrowth of Freud's:

[D]on't forget that for years I have been occupied with nothing but the products of your intellect, and I have also always felt the man behind every sentence of your works and made him my confidant. Whether you want to be or not, you are one of the great master teachers of mankind, and you must allow your readers to approach you, at least intellectually, in a personal relationship as well. My ideal of truth that strikes down all consideration is certainly nothing less than the most self-evident consequence of your teachings. (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 3 Oct. 1910, Letter 170, 219)

Ferenczi, occupied with nothing but the products of Freud's intellect, resembles both the secretary he balked at becoming, and the paranoid psychotic who finds himself entirely a product of the thoughts of the other. Ferenczi's being "nothing but" an outgrowth of the master gives him a particular sort of psychic intimacy with him:

So I am and have been much, much more intimately acquainted and conversant with you than you could have imagined. Strangely -and that is the point of my case history that appears neurotic, even demented- I forgot to take into account the fact that you could not have known all that—and even if you did know it, it would on no account have obliged you to dispense completely with your justified distrust of people . . . and give yourself over to someone, e.g., an enthusiastic, impertinent youngster. (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 3 Oct. 1910, Letter 170, 219)

Ferenczi's intimacy with Freud's intellectual work is inseparable from his experience of intimacy with Freud the man: "I am convinced that I am not the only one who in important decisions, in self criticism, etc., always asks and has asked himself the question: How would Freud relate to this? Under 'Freud' I understood his teachings and his personality, fused together in a harmonic unity" (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 3 Oct. 1910, Letter 170, 219).

The paradox of psychoanalysis is that it dismantles myths of authority and origins (in its analysis of the Oedipal conflict, transference, etc.) while installing its creator, Freud, in the place of original authority. For Ferenczi, desire for knowledge of Freud's ideas shades into desire for Freud the man, for the theoretical knowledge of the psyche that psychoanalysis promises and for the autobiography from which the theory springs. If transference provides a method for understanding and enacting unconscious emotional ties to others, then the maneuverings of the early analysts around Freud expose the ways in which theoretical knowledge in psychoanalysis arises from what can appear at times to resemble psychotic desire -transference out of bounds. Given Ferenczi's desire for, and understanding of, the psychoanalytic breakdown of the barrier between the intellectual and the emotional it is not surprising that he both engages with such enthusiasm in thought transference experiments and expresses his relentless transference desire for Freud through fantasies of thought transference. Unlike psychoanalytic transference, thought transference is not expected to employ substitute objects. It aims for absolute openness -wanting (and knowing) the man and his theory.

For Ferenczi this breakdown of barriers, this giving over wholly to another the truth of the self, becomes the utopian possibility toward which psychoanalysis should strive:

The final consequence of [psychoanalytic] insight -when it is present in two people- is that they are not ashamed in front of each other, keep nothing secret, tell each other the truth without risk of insult or in the certain hope that within the truth there can be no lasting insult. . . according to my [psychoanalytic] ideal there are no halfway standards; all consideration for people and conditions disappears beside my ideal of truth. (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 3 Oct. 1910, Letter 170, 219–20)

But what if Ferenczi's ideal of truth is psychotic? Paranoia may be an appropriate response in a world where people are occupied with nothing but the products of your thoughts. For Freud, paranoia, as he is about to publish in "Schreber," is indissociable from homosexuality. He claims that "what lies at the core of the conflict in cases of paranoia among males is a homosexual wishful phantasy of *loving a man*" (Freud SE 12: 62). Freud's conclusions have been attacked, and in my view, rightly so, for assuming that homosexuality is equivalent to narcissistic desire or desire for the same, but his formulation of paranoia as a disavowal of homosexual desire provides a compelling logical mechanism through which to understand homophobic disavowals.¹⁵ According to Freud, what the paranoid disavows in his delusions of persecution is the working out of the simple sentence "I (a man) *love him* (a man)" which is turned around into "I hate him":

This contradiction, which must have run thus in the unconscious, cannot, however, become conscious to a paranoid in this form. The mechanism of symptom-formation in paranoia requires that internal perceptions -feelings- shall be replaced by external perceptions. Consequently the proposition "I hate him" becomes transformed by projection into another one: "He hates (persecutes) me, which will justify me in hating him." And thus the impelling unconscious feeling makes its appearance as though

it were the consequence of an external perception:

"I do not love him -I hate him, because HE PERSECUTES ME." (Freud SE 12: 63)

Paranoia results from repressed homosexuality for Freud because of a deep-rooted, definitionally uncanny fear of the same that is never questioned. This fear is connected to a constitutive fear of losing one's individual boundaries -a simultaneously seductive and frightening lack of barriers between minds and bodies that was, at the turn of the century, often associated with thought transference.¹⁶ In paranoid logic, the desired other, whose similarity fascinates but also threatens the borders of the self, can only be seen as persecuting.

Ferenczi, living with and through these theories, circumvents them by diving in -by inviting both homosexuality and psychosis. In his pleading letter to Freud after the Schreber incident, Ferenczi begs him to, "let a part of your homosexual libido be refloated and bring more sympathy to bear toward my 'ideal of honesty'" (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 12 Oct. 1910, Letter 173, 226). He asks Freud for unimpeded access to him: "My dream in which I saw you standing naked before me (naturally without feeling the slightest conscious [indeed, also in my dream still unconscious] sexual arousal) was the transparent symbolization of 1) the ucs. homosexual tendency and 2) the longing for absolute mutual openness" (Ferenczi and Freud, 3 Oct. 1910, Letter 170, 218). Homosexuality, along with thought transference, is a figure for Ferenczi of this absolute openness. Yet of course, both configurations of relationship to the other are also more than figures. They both represent, in terms of psychoanalytic logic, simultaneously a sexual (for Ferenczi, generalized to societalutopian) fantasy and the threat of paranoid psychosis. These anxious figures of intimacy -standing naked in front of someone, scooping out the insides of their mind, finding someone else in your place, with your thoughts, writing your psychoanalytic article about paranoia- seem at different times pleasurable and dangerous, rhetorical and material. Thought transference, like homosexuality, is imagined as simultaneously physically invasive, and dematerialized or purified: the almost Edenic dream of standing naked without sexual desire.

Ferenczi's interest in thought transference experiments indicates some of the ways in which his sometimes outrageous practices figure the literal, and literalize the figurative in the slide between bodily and psychic intimacy. One particularly rich example of this slide occurs with Ferenczi's paranormally sensitive homosexual patient. Ferenczi writes to Freud about an incident in which his patient jumped up from the couch claiming there were worms on it. Ferenczi then records his own free associations, connecting them to his patient's telepathic abilities:

I had sexual intercourse on the same day. The thought occurred to me that it is not right to use the same couch for one's occupation and for making love. The woman with whom I had intercourse calls spermatozoa "little worms. . . ." On the same day I thought of the possibility that a person with a fine sense of smell could sense that something took place there. [It is improbable that material traces had remained on the couch. That had been seen to. But such a thing cannot be dismissed.] (Ferenczi and Freud, vol. 1, 17 Aug. 1910, Letter 160, 206)

What sort of intimacy is appropriate to the psychoanalytic office in which Ferenczi first has sex with a woman and then apparently has his thoughts read by a gay man? John Forrester has suggested that Freud's interest in theorizing incest can be seen to emerge from the embroiled sexual, familial, and psychoanalytic relations that prevailed among the early analysts -Ferenczi being one of the most "incestuous."¹⁷ Ferenczi's ongoing affairs with Gizella Pálos, whom he eventually married, and her daughter Elma, whom he analyzed, fell in love with, wanted to marry, and sent to Freud for further analysis, make his correspondence with Freud sometimes seem like a theoretically-charged enactment of Levi-Strauss's theory of the circulation of women. On Ferenczi's couch, this other scene of circulation -of thought transference transacted between two men over the physical or psychological remains of a heterosexual encounter- similarly becomes an occult version of Eve Sedgwick's *Between Men*.

Generally, Ferenczi's writings on homosexuality mirror Freud's, claiming that "paranoia is perhaps nothing else at all than disguised homosexuality" (Ferenczi, *Sex* 133). But if Ferenczi still obliquely pathologizes homosexuality by seeing paranoia as a defense against it, then a paranoid lack of boundaries is also his psychoanalytic ideal, his "ideal of truth." His urging of Freud to release some of his homosexual libidinal cathexes onto himself suggests that Ferenczi's theories and practice are at odds. His need to construct himself as nothing but the product of Freud's intellect leads him to follow Freud in identifying repressed homosexuality with paranoia, by simultaneously participating in and diagnosing the fear of the same. Yet in Ferenczi's own practice, which includes his experiments with thought transference, and in his correspondence with Freud, sameness is usually seen as promising rather than threatening.

I want to turn finally to a different threatening model of the permeable subject in Ferenczi -one which is also bound up with the idea of materialized invasion. In his final paper, "Confusion of Tongues," Ferenczi returns to Freud's earliest ideas about the traumatic causes of neuroses. Anticipating recent debates about child sexual abuse, Ferenczi claims that children fall victim to rape more often than suspected, and that this abuse can result in an overwhelming identification with the aggressor, who is usually a parent or parent figure:

The abused child turns into a mechanically obedient being or becomes defiant, but can no longer account for the reason for the defiance, even to himself.... The scientific importance of the observation is the assumption that the still not well-developed personality [of the child] responds to sudden unpleasure, not with defense, but with identification and introjection of the menacing person or aggressor, and identification based on fear.... Now we must revert to ideas long ago developed by Freud, who even then pointed out that the capacity for object-love is preceded by a stage of identification. (Ferenczi, "Confusion" 291)

The violence of the seduction scene leads to this formative identification for Ferenczi because he literalizes the appropriation of the body and mind. Ferenczi theorizes and experiences the permeability of the psyche substantially, both in his theory of trauma and through his patients. He imagines mutual analysis as an exchange of unconscious ideas, but also of substance: "The two unconsciouses thereby receive mutual help; the 'healer' himself would gain some tranquillity from the healed and viceversa. Both emphasizing this mutual flux be taken in the substantial sense and not merely explained in terms of psychology" (Ferenczi, *Clinical Diary* 12).

Ferenczi is fascinated by "the general question of the physical and the psychical," taking his patient's experiences of invasion literally and materially (Ferenczi, *Clinical Diary* 5). If in "Dreams and Occultism," Freud seems theoretically drawn towards the "physical equivalent of the psychical act," he eventually shies away from announcing its existence. Ferenczi, by contrast, consistently brings the material world and psychic reality together by insisting that transference processes are both psychic and substantial. He suggests that the analyst should open himself up to the potential reality contained in the delusions of psychotics:

*I do not exclude the possibility that delusional productions contain more objective reality than we have assumed until now. From the very beginning I was inclined to think that the hallucinations of the insane, or at least a part of them, are not imaginings but real perceptions, stemming from the environment and from the psyche of other human beings, which are accessible to them -precisely because of their psychologically motivated hypersensitivity- whereas normal people, focusing only on immediate matters of direct concern to them, remain unaffected. (Ferenczi, *Clinical Diary* 58)*

For Ferenczi, occult powers are aligned with psychosis; paranormal hypersensitivity and psychic illness may issue from the same causes.

Paranoids experience a particular form of psychic and physical permeability:

To what extent do those who have "gone mad" from pain, that is, those who have departed from the

usual egocentric point of view, become able through their special situation to experience a part of that immaterial reality which remains inaccessible to us materialists? And here the direction of research must become involved with the so-called occult. Cases of thought transference during the analysis of suffering people are extraordinarily frequent. (Ferenczi, Clinical Diary 33)

This belief in the supermaterial experiences of his patients returns Ferenczi at the end of his life to the seduction theory. The infant who experiences an annihilating traumatic sexual attack reacts to it by introjecting and totally identifying with her aggressor. Ferenczi's theory of trauma suggests that the psychosis caused by a childhood sexual attack results in a collapsing of the body and the mind that can initiate clairvoyant or telepathic hypersensitivity. This collapsing becomes crucial, both as the content of the illness: the patient's overproximate identification with the attacker, and the potential technique of the cure: the analyst's overproximate identification with the patient. Instead of distancing himself from his patients' delusions, Ferenczi's practice of psychoanalysis steers a course directly towards them. In the final years of his life, he embraces the possibility of sharing in his patients' delusions.

For Ferenczi, the best analysts and the most damaged psychotics share the ability to transgress normal sense boundaries, linking the most immaterial forms of transmission with the most material:

It seems that the hypersensitivity of the sense organs, as I have found with some mediums, was to be traced back to the anxious listening for any wish-impulses of a cruel person. Presumably therefore, all mediums are such overanxious people, who are attuned to the slightest vibrations, those accompanying cognitive and affective processes too, even from a distance. Here link with the telegraphic, electro-radio-telegraphic and -telephonic hallucinations of the mentally ill. Perhaps there are no hallucinations, but only an illusionary working through of real events.

The isochronism of dreams corresponding to reality of several patients could be explained . . . perhaps my person is only a relay station, through which the two of them [his two patients, SI and RN] can come into immediate contact with one another. In this dream that shock tried to reassert itself, but the greater independence acquired in analysis refuses to accept the exogenous substance or emotion into the ego. She rejects, with, as it were, deadly determination, the fare offered to it, saying, "Please eat it yourself! Deal with it yourself! I will not let myself be tortured instead of you." In order to make this explanation even more plausible, it must be said that the most abominable cruelty that the patient was subjected to was in fact this: she was forced to swallow the severed genitals of a repugnant black man, who had just been killed. (Ferenczi, Clinical Diary 140)

Here is one psychotic endpoint to an unwavering belief in the seduction theory: the literalization of introjection in a gruesome, surprisingly racialized scene, which Ferenczi takes literally. Beginning with his theories about the developed hypersensitivity of the abused, Ferenczi speculates on the possibility that all hallucinations are really "an illusionary working through of real events." He goes on to propose that dreams might be telepathically shared, that the analyst can become simply a relay station between the thoughts of his patients as they communicate to and through each other. All of Ferenczi's most wild and disturbing suppositions here rely on a psychotic literalization of psychological processes. The danger of endorsing the possibility of direct transmissibility from world to mind is that the doctor starts to sound like the psychotic.

If Ferenczi's relentless attempts to theorize psychoanalytic transmission lead him down bizarre paths, this is in part because his theories are enmeshed in his radical practices -particularly his overwhelming identifications with his patients: "Pride: I am the *first* crazy person who had acquired critical insight, and had *yielded to everyone...*" (Ferenczi, *Clinical Diary* 161). Ferenczi yields by imagining a world without barriers between bodies or minds. Sexuality holds out different promises and dangers for him than for Freud because he reconfigures intimacy in analysis and out of it. For Ferenczi, the unsuccessful disavowal of homosexuality theoretically leads to paranoid psychosis, as it does for Freud, but a release of homosexual libido can promise a

utopian collapse of boundaries that may also appear through thought transference. Conversely, heterosexuality, by the time of the *Clinical Diary*, is returned to the seduction theory; a violent, invasive rape becomes formative for its victims of their subjectivities, and of their potentially telepathic sensitivity to others' thoughts and desires. Both scenarios suggest that the occult does return as sexuality in psychoanalysis, specifically as a sexuality that knows no borders, that posits people as too close, as overlapping, as disturbingly intimate. Freud's anxieties and Ferenczi's hopes erupt in this sexualized, spatialized arena.

In 1958 in a lecture titled "Ferenczi: False Problem or Real Misunderstanding," Wladimir Granoff claimed that "Ferenczi has always been and will always be the main character in psychoanalysis." Granoff continues: "If Freud invented psychoanalysis, Ferenczi did psychoanalysis. And more . . . he did analysis insofar as it is a living pulsation" (Chertok and Stengers 103). Surely the Hungarian ventriloquist would have appreciated his gratifying, if potentially paranoid promotion to main character. Undoubtedly, Ferenczi did and lived psychoanalysis. By theorizing and acting out his own spectacular transmissions and blinding identifications, one might even say, he swallowed it whole.

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Notas al final

- 1.- See Laplanche and Pontalis for the best exegesis of Freud's early reworkings and refinings of the seduction theory. See Rose for a thoughtful and devastating critique of Masson.
- 2.- Ferenczi's mental health at the end of his life, particularly the effects of his pernicious anemia, has been the subject of much debate. With typical panache Ernest Jones claims "Ferenczi, more gradually towards the end of his life, developed psychotic manifestations that revealed themselves, among other ways, in a turning away from Freud and his doctrines" (3: 47). It is difficult to trust Jones's diagnosis of his ex-analyst and rival for Freud's affections when Ferenczi's apostasy becomes equated with his psychosis. However, reading Ferenczi's final Clinical Diary is undoubtedly a disturbing experience. In this article I hope to suggest there may be more fruitful ways to approach the question of Ferenczi's final writings than either damning or celebrating his mental state.
- 3.- He delivered a lecture on "Experiments with thought transference" to the Vienna Society on 19 November 1913. It was not the first time the Society had discussed thought transference: "On February 8, 1910, a debate was held on the phenomena of spiritualism and clairvoyance at the meeting of the Viennese Psychoanalytic Association, where Freud remarked that if one assumes the existence of such phenomena, then their nature would be rather physiological than psychological" (Hidas 209).
- 4.- See particularly Roustang, "Suggestion over the Long Term."
- 5.- See Geoffrey Gilbert's book, *Before Modernism Was* (forthcoming from Macmillan) for more on the relationship between privacy, smoking, anti-Semitism, and psychoanalysis.
- 6.- "If psychoanalysis were to renounce its effort to be a transmissible science, independent of its founder or of those who refound it through their theorizations, it would inevitably fall into occultism and magic... This practice would fall back into the unsayable and the ineffable and thus into all the obscurantist manipulations without the aid of a theoretical apparatus. Any therapeutic effect would be reduced to personal power, to the qualities of the analyst, and one would never get beyond the level of faith healing and witchcraft: powers and gifts transmitted from one individual to another through the telling of a secret to be kept secret" (Roustang, *Dire* 60–61). Critics have argued that Freud's efforts to distinguish psychoanalysis from occultism were bound up with his desire to establish psychoanalysis as a scientific and medical institution: "Psychoanalysis has always struggled to distance itself from supposedly discredited things like religion, glamour, mysticism, radical politics, the paranormal, and all the scapegoated 'alternative' therapies. Psychoanalysis, that is to say, has used its discovery of the unconscious to legitimate itself" (Phillips 18–19).
- 7.- Freud's discussion of the transmission of primal fantasies in the Introductory Lectures was based primarily on his notes from the Wolfman case which he had completed two or three years earlier. Also see Freud's *A Phylogenetic Fantasy*.
- 8.- Jones, Vol. 2, 219, quoting Freud letter to Karl Abraham, 11 Nov. 1917.
- 9.- Lamarck's term *besoin* caused much controversy for his later interpreters. Because it could be translated as either "desire" or "need" Lamarck was accused of attributing a will and consciousness to animals' struggle for adaptation. According to Ludmilla Jordanova, Lamarck's intended meaning was closer to "need." *Besoin* was meant "to suggest the biological imperative or drive which led animals to adapt to changing environmental conditions to ensure their survival" (Jordanova 102).
- 10.- For Lacan, telepathic transference springs from the same sources as psychoanalytic transference. But he also extends his idea of the circuit claiming that the unconscious: is the discourse of the circuit in which I am integrated. I am one of its links. It is the discourse of my father for instance, in so far as my father made mistakes which I am absolutely condemned to reproduce -that's what we call the super-ego. I am condemned to reproduce them because I am obliged to pick up again the discourse he bequeathed to me, not simply because I am his son, but because one can't stop the chain of discourse, and it is precisely my duty to transmit it in its aberrant form to someone else. I have to put to someone else the problem of a situation of life or death in which the chances are that it is just as likely that he will falter, in such a way that this discourse produces a small circuit in which an entire family, an entire coterie, an entire camp, an entire nation or half of the world will be caught. (89–90)
- 11.- "That Freud describes his disciples as a savage horde can be related to what he says in *Totem and Taboo*: the sons kill each other in order to take the place of the father. We propose the following hypothesis: when creating his own myth Freud simply looked around him" (Roustang, *Dire* 16).
- 12.- Santner 153, footnote 4. My discussion of originality and plagiarism in relation to the Schreber case and the early psychoanalysts intersects with Santner's at many points.
- 13.- In his biography of Freud, Peter Gay states that in "April 1928 (Freud) told the Hungarian psychoanalyst István Hollós that he resisted dealing with psychotics: 'Finally I confessed to myself that I do not like these sick people, that I am angry at them to feel them so far from me and all that is human.'" (Gay 537, qting. Freud to Hollós, 10 April 1928. Freud Museum, London). Ferenczi, in his Clinical Diary, also faults Freud for despising his patients (92–93).
- 14.- The whole question of the assumption and development of the confidentiality of the psychoanalytic office has been approached interestingly by John Forrester in "Psychoanalysis: gossip, telepathy and/or science?" and "Casualties of Truth."
- 15.- See Warner, "Homo-Narcissism; or, Heterosexuality." Christopher Craft also claims: "Without doubt Freud must be credited with the radical insight into the mechanism of paranoia; the recognition that in heterosexist culture persecutory paranoia and 'homosexuality' stand in a reciprocating, mutually identifying relation" (Craft 100).
- 16.- The first chapter of my forthcoming book, *Magical Thinking: Intimacy, Technology and the Occult Imagination at the Turn of the Century*, further explores these turn-of-the-century cultural associations between homosexuality and thought transference through the Society for Psychical Research's telepathic experiments, and fiction such as the 1890s group-written gay pornographic novel, *Teleny* (Wilde, et al.). Works Cited.
- 17.- See "Casualties of Truth." Forrester goes on to suggest, in a formulation I would second, that the incestuous networks he traces may be another name for the cultural unconscious (93).