‘THIS IS HOW YOU LOOK’ MIMICRY AS DEFENSE OF THE ACTUAL (OR HIDDEN) CHILD IN SANDOR FERENCZI’S PSYCHOANALYSIS (*)

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Psychoanalysis is a misfit’s enterprise. Not only does it thrive on conceptions of the misfit child (think Freud’s polymorphously perverse infant for whom libido attaches to an indiscriminate multitude of things and body parts), but it is a misfitting, polymorphous discipline itself, at once a hermeneutic, a clinical method, and a free standing institution, all impervious to certain regulatory mechanisms by dint of the unconscious as an inherently recalcitrant force. It is as if psychoanalysis is a counter-discipline well-suited, then, for theorizing the misfit child as recursively caught between the social and the clinical, between the needs of the child as a social player dependent on adults and the child as an unconscious entity pining for its own authentic mode of being. While replete with theorists both for and against the misfit child’s adaptation to social order, the ultimate theorist of this child in psychoanalysis is perhaps Freud’s iconoclastic protégé, Sandor Ferenczi. Indeed, Ferenczi came to be known as the enfant terrible of psychoanalysis,[1] a designation that evinces the way in which he himself embodied the misfit child (especially) in his own day.

Analysis, for Ferenczi, was always a child analysis of sorts -child analysis *in* the analysis of the adult. Ferenczi’s child was thus not solely an observable, empirical child, but the child as a tenuous internal object hiding out in the adult’s unconscious. Ferenczi tarried with the unconscious of his adult patients in search of this child, his beacon in such work being the play of subtle shifts in the patient’s psyche-somatic states and his eye for the patient’s spontaneous affective expressions. It is precisely this play of affect and embodied fantasy -play, we might add, especially manifest in the queer child-patient’s erotic longings for the same sex parent-analyst- that Ferenczi found was prohibited and denied by the patient’s adult caregivers. The child’s identification with such denial signals the repression of true affect and the resultant formation of an unconscious fragment that Ferenczi termed “the actual child.”[2] The realm of the actual child is thus an orphanage of sorts, a mine of split-off affect dwelling deep in the psyche. The child as a social identity, then, emerges from these depths, interpellated into a discursive order dictated by adults for whom affective expression must be judged and constricted according to adult mores.

An “actual trauma,”[3] this rejection of the child’s feeling is so widespread and in fact almost a given in our world that, with such views, Ferenczi ranks himself amongst some of the more infamous pessimists in Western thought. Trauma is thus not only the cause of neurosis; for Ferenczi, it is the very basis of human subjectivity. We are traumatized over and over throughout life, beginning with the banishment of the actual child or repressed affect -two ultimately synonymous terms in his metapsychology- and continuing with traumatic experiences that highlight decline, decay, and the sense in which seemingly normative, small-t trauma can (de)form us in potentially big-t trauma ways. The confrontation between child and adult is interpellative and therefore a social process, yet it is one that is continuous with the intrapsychic, thus calling for a social psychoanalysis and a metapsychology that is recursively intertwined with the socio-cultural field.

The actual child, Ferenczi discovered, comes forth in clinical psychoanalysis, but only in the instant, in *kairos* or a queer time,[4] in which repressed affect is presented and ephemerally shared in the analyst-patient dyad. The actual child is the seat of true desire, a bedfellow of sorts with the queer, for both tamper with unrepresentability: the former with unrepresentable affect and the latter with the unrepresentability of a

queer childhood. The queer, like the actual child, is only ever lived in the après coup of childhood itself.[5] It is as if the actual child as repressed affect is tantamount to the queer, as if the actual child is also, in some sense, a queer child whose desire is proscribed and banned from expression. Given this censorship, a defense is needed if only for preservation of a future time when the actual or queer child might emerge; for as we know, by definition the actual child could not speak at the time of the trauma, which defers its "coming out" to a later date. Like the child with the adult, the Medusa in Ferenczi's view must also rely on the mimetic defense to commucate with her aggressor; for "when the Medusa, threatened with decapitation, makes a horrible angry face, she is actually holding up a mirror to the bestial attacker, as though she were saying: *this is how you look*."[6] Mimetic defense thus doubles as both shield and weapon respectively, to protect the child and to command that the adult give an account of himself as a discursive overlord (de) forming the child in the interest of hegemony.

HORACE: TRAUMA AND THE AFFECTIVELY QUEER CHILD

Birth is a trauma, thought Ferenczi, whose 1925 book *Thalassa* was originally entitled *The Catastrophe of Birth*.[7] While normative and reparable by good enough post-natal holding, the trauma of birth is nevertheless profound for engendering a desire for the "perfect harmony and rest that existed before the child traumatically enters life and awakes."[8] Echoing pessimist Emil Cioran's notion that there is trouble in the very fact of being born, Ferenczi's womb is a place to which we seek yet cannot return, a death and nostalgia that we go on suffering throughout our lives.[9] "Actual trauma," Ferenczi writes, "is experienced by children in situations where . . . adaptation, a change in their own behavior, is forced on them. . . . From then on, neither subjective nor objective experience alone will be perceived as an integrated emotional unit."[10] The desire for an integrated emotional unit is a variation of the desire for the return to the womb, and while we insatiably seek this return through out our lifespan, and while it is never, of course, fully achieved, evoking the actual child in the adult is a means of redressing the fracture of that emotional unit, a means of restoring, even if momentarily, the spontaneity and fluid queerness of the child's oneness in the womb.

Queerness here is meant to denote a gender and sexual fluidity intrinsic to childhood and adolescence,[11] but integral to that fluidity, it is argued, is an affective self-relation that transgresses injunctions around contained emotional expression. Georges Bataille likens eroticism -by which he means an inherently queer psychosexuality that lacks reproductive aims and therefore "calls [our] being into question"[12]- to a relational experience of affect, for along with eroticism and mystical states, this is how subjectivity is communicated, "from *subject to subject* through a sensible, emotional contact."[13] Bataille also likens this communication to death, as does Ferenczi, for whom a return to the womb is its equivalent, symbolized by the primitive practice of burying the dead in fetal position.[14] Summoning the repressed affect that Ferenczi associates with the actual child in the adult unconscious therefore presents us with an emotional stirring in the adult that is necessarily saturated with the fundamentally queer fluidity of childhood.

To illustrate this summoning of the actual child, we turn to Horace, an early 30's, queer, Caucasian and cisgendered non-profit worker, who entered a four times a week psychoanalysis approximately one year ago. Horace had long wanted to try analysis, having studied psychoanalytic theory in college and been through much psychotherapy that in the end left him wanting. Early in the analysis, Horace mentioned the desire to become less anxious around men, particularly straight men, whom he generally perceived to be angry and prone to violence. He also sought help for masochistic tendencies such as self-deprecation, attraction to self-injury, and drug addiction, the latter of which was long in remission. As a child, Horace weathered a great deal of physical and emotional trauma. His memory, he realized, was actually a catalogue of photographs, one-dimensional and flat, for in fact he remembered very little of what was a quite violent childhood.

One photograph in particular seized Horace's attention. In it, a five-year old Horace is attending one of his brothers' wrestling matches and is decked out in full wrestling regalia -leotard, headgear and all- with a curious choice of footwear in the form of soccer cleats. He is posing as a wrestler, his imitation of the competitors appearing to suggest an aspiration to join them, to become a wrestler himself, albeit a versatile one perhaps ready to play soccer when the wrestling gets dull. While such mimicry always seemed quite

mundane and developmentally normative to Horace, analysis invites one to take a second look at that which upon first glance might seem harmless and quotidian.

Horace recalled that his brother, also queer, described wrestling as an extremely traumatizing experience, one teeming with childist homophobia, derision and emasculation (he was accused of "wrestling like a girl"), much of this emanating from their father who mandated all the boys, save for Horace, into wrestling. Horace wondered if his performance in the wrestler's uniform was in fact a deterrent, a subtly subversive adaptation to his father's will, or what is referred to in the following paper as a mimetic defense. The uniform, in this view, was a shield that guarded the "actual child," which for Horace was an avowedly queer child that intuited the need to hide his queerness by becoming a wrestler too, mimetically shaping himself to the father aggressor's normativizing gaze while laterally identifying with his brother who, like him, had to hide the actual, queer child until a future environment might facilitate its emergence. A shield turned weapon, the uniform also held the promise of communicating to the father that Horace already felt the need to defend himself, to wrestle so to speak, not with another boy just yet, but with his father's interpellation and prescription that the boy grows in the direction of a linearly scripted, heterocentric manhood.

FERENCZI'S METAPSYCHOLOGY OF TRAUMA

Freud likened metapsychology to a "witch" whose powers are ultimately elusive and potentially misleading, and yet nonetheless necessary for psychoanalytic theory and practice.[15] The "originality of psychoanalysis," according to Dominique Scarfone, "consists in having a metapsychological perspective," which is always oriented around the *infans*, or "one who is unable to speak."[16] In his *Clinical Diary*, Ferenczi sketches a metapsychology centering on "a being suffering purely psychically in his unconscious, *the actual child*, of whom the awakened ego knows absolutely nothing."[17] Ferenczi's "actual child" is his *infans*, dissociated as a fragment of the adult personality. While Ferenczi refers to this fragment as a child, it is also elsewhere referred to as "*the pure, repressed affect*"[18], affect that arose not solely from phylogeny, as Freud would have it, but also from real, historical encounters in the social world. The actual child cannot be extricated from these encounters nor, however, can it be reduced to them. There is a mutually constitutive relationship, a recursion between unconscious affect and the social encounter, so that when Ferenczi emphasizes the importance of the analyst holding the adult-child patient's trauma to be real, he means in large part that it was affectively, somatically, and, at least to some extent, actually "real" regardless of the narrative's veracity. The trauma, for Ferenczi, *did* happen -it happened in the course of the individual's life, not in the genesis myth of a primal horde.[19]

The outline of Ferenczi's metapsychology appears early in the *Clinical Diary*, primarily in the entry titled "Case of Schizophrenia Progressiva (R.N.)"[20] and it is given a more schematic rather than systematic elaboration throughout the book. Ferenczi describes the atomization of the personality in response to "a double shock: 1) trauma (and) 2) denial."[21] While Ferenczi's turn to historical trauma as the impetus for psychic structuralization departs from the Freudian emphasis on phylogenetic inheritance and endogenous drives, he nevertheless retains the concepts of drive and instinct, albeit as forces that are thoroughly dependent on the environment for their velocity and shape. Trauma, in Ferenczi's view, seeds itself into the body, germinating the drive as the instinct's mental counterpart.

In his landmark paper of 1932, "Confusion of Tongues," Ferenczi revised Freud's original seduction theory by resurrecting its contention that the sexual abuse of children is in fact a reality. This appalled the psychoanalytic community, ultimately leading to Ferenczi's excommunication from the international society. For much of 1932, the year preceding his death, Ferenczi wrote detailed accounts of his clinical work, which culminated in the Clinical Diary. While Ferenczi's later trauma theories indeed focused on specific incidents of child abuse recounted by his patients, Ferenczi also discerned a socialization process between the adult and the child that he referred to as "identification with the aggressor."[22] Akin to Louis Althusser's concept of interpellation,[23] Ferenczi's identification with the aggressor is what enables the child to endure subjection to the adult's traumatizing projections. Subjectivity, it follows, is inherently traumatic in that it is the consequence of the double shock -that is, of the original, overwhelming trauma of interpellation and the need to deny the

interpellative event in an effort to protect the abuser on whom the victim depends. This shock in turn splinters the personality into three fragments: "the actual child," "Orpha," and "the soulless part of the personality."[24] Together these fragments form an intrapsychic and yet inherently social unconscious.

Ferenczi's actual child is "*pure, repressed affect*" that "must be shaken awake mentally and sometimes also physically."[25] To reach the actual child, Ferenczi sometimes used various forms of touch, in some cases holding the patient's hand or infamously kissing them on the head; but mostly he used the "relaxation method" in which tenderness and tact (or "the capacity for empathy"[26]) induced the patient's regression, allowing for a salutary contrast between the traumatic situation of childhood and the relatively safe environment of the analysis. Given these conditions, an affective presentation of dissociated events might emerge. Herein, Ferenczi is strictly interested in the fate of the *infans*, and it is by virtue of the two other psychical fragments that the *infans* or actual child perseveres.

"Orpha" is a "guardian angel" and the bearer of "organizing life instincts."[27]She is essentially the protector of the orphaned, actual child, a protector that in the words of Ferenczi scholar Hayuta Gurevich goes to "search for the abandoned infant, the orphan, to raise the dead frozen infantile psyche from the underworld."[28] The actual child -abandoned to the underworld like Orpheus who could not resist looking at Eurydice before completing his ascent- is therefore encapsulated in a fragment of time, which forms "a third soulless part of the personality, that is to say, with a body progressively divested of its soul, whose disintegration is not perceived at all or is regarded as an event happening to another person, being watched from the outside."[29] Implicit to Ferenczi's "*tripartitum*" is a tragic view of development in which the actual child, the child of spontaneity and uninhibited affect, is abandoned through the child's identification with the adult-aggressor. This third fragment -the soulless part of the personality- then watches as the actual child deteriorates under the guardianship of Orpha, who will not go looking for the child until the external environment is safe enough to do so.

MIMETIC MISFIT: HORACE AS A GRIMACING CHILD

As protector of the actual child, Orpha mobilizes defenses in the form of compliance or deviance, the exceptionally obedient child or the child in revolt. Both children identify with the aggressor, imitating dissociated aspects of the adult personality, partly to defend the unborn actual child, but also, it is argued -and this is where we diverge from Althusser's interpellation- to critique the adult by way of mimesis. While Althusser and others see no potential for critique in imitation because the child is not yet agentic and is instead wholly leaning on the other for its subjectivity, Ferenczi avers that the child's imitation can return the adult's aggression, thereby exposing the relational basis of all claims to power, claims so often made in the name of an ideal selfhood.[30] It is as if the child's imitation performatively echoes Leo Bersani's axiom, "the self is a practical convenience. Promoted to the status of an ethical ideal, it is a sanction for violence."[31] Imitation, in other words, carries the potential for a critique of identity itself as a traumatic impingement.

"In situations where protest and negative reaction ... are forbidden," Ferenczi writes, "criticism can find expression only in an indirect form."[32] He goes on to describe "the child who in grimacing distorts himself but only to show the other how he looks."[33] The child's mimicry of the adult commands an accounting for the prohibition and prescription that interpellates the child into such behavior. Commenting on Ferenczi's theory, Michael Balint writes, "children are made to lie only because the grown-ups, through their hypocritical behavior, prevent them from being sincere."[34] Balint points to the adult's hypocrisy that forbids the child to lie while denying them the very conditions that would allow for truthful communications. He asserts that children need to play, that play is the child's truth of sorts, and yet it is play that adult morality prohibits. In Horace's case, it is the play of childhood queerness, policed by the culture of wrestling as a satellite of his father's will. Rather than protest this situation, the child mimics the adult's hypocrisy, which Horace did by donning the wrestling uniform, partly as defense and in the interest of needing his father, but also as an attempt to create a third space, a space for reflection in the midst of violence for which their was no witness, a space that might impeach hegemonic boyhood before its interpellative violence was effaced in the second shock of denial.

Horace came out at 15 and shortly thereafter began a life of alcohol and drug abuse, thus turning his suppressed criticism of father and family against himself. Such criticism, Ferenczi notes, must be illustrated

"indirectly on oneself through exaggerated, crazy behavior," behavior for which Horace's drug addled mischief surely qualifies. While Horace's outing seemed to offer some solution or respite, and did in the forging of ties with other LGBT (no Q in the early 1990s) peoples (including his brother), it necessarily attracted a great deal of attention, both internal and external, to his private world. In claiming a gay identity, he was simultaneously dispossessed of some part of himself, coming out having ruined what were once the private fantasies of childhood. Drugs and alcohol became Horace's proverbial grimace, mimetically performing the alienation and dispossession that he had experienced long ago in the double shock of interpellation, a shock in which he identified with his father's gaze (becoming a wrestler) and disidentified with his brother's (and his own) childhood queerness. The deviance of drugs and alcohol thus served multiple purposes: as a destruction of the aggressor with which he had identified, a destruction of the self as crafted in his father's eyes; as an Orphic protection of the actual child awakened by the expression of homosexual desire at a time when he was still dependent on a neglectful family; and as a critique of heterocentric developmental trajectories that barred the expression of his lateral identification with his queer brother. His deviance, while no doubt destructive, nevertheless cordoned off a space for the potential self, a space where the actual child had been hidden, unconsciously lying in wait for some kind of actualization.

HORACE: MIMETIC DEFENSE AND THE TIME OF THE ACTUAL CHILD

In the seventh month of his analysis, Horace shared that he had started reading various pieces of psychoanalytic literature. One day, after reading Winnicott, Horace became hopeful about his progress and the possibility that something curative had taken hold in the treatment. Child analyst Anne Alvarez calls attention to the way that hope as an affect gets short shrift in psychoanalysis since Freud so heavily emphasized reality as a fundamentally painful and disappointing affair. Horace therefore had good reason to be nervous about sharing his hope in analysis given Freud-the-father's more cynical tendentiousness. Alvarez cautions, "such a [cynical] theory can be harmful in the work with . . . some deprived children who may need to work through, and come to terms with, another type of 'reality,' one which may contain hope, security, and even, pleasure."[35]

With heaps of hesitation and self-doubt, Horace nevertheless attempted to communicate this hope to his analyst. His nervous excitement recalled the discovery of a solution so seemingly evident in the photograph of him in wrestling attire, a photograph symbolic of his compromise to split identifications stealthily between his father and his queer brother. Horace talked of using his analyst, as in Winnicott's object usage -a more developed stage on the way to whole object relating- and his analyst listened, gently commenting. Eventually his analyst interpreted, citing a conflict in Horace's aspirations and the potential reality of Horace's immense needs: Horace hoped to be treating his analyst as a good mother and a full subject, but the analyst offered the possibility that Horace still needed him as an ever present breast and a sometimes bad part object. In response, Horace sat up, grabbed two pillows, pulled them to his chest, and moved slowly toward the foot of the analytic couch. Horace later reported no conscious control of these movements, confirming that they had happened spontaneously, or in what Ferenczi referred to as "a twilight state"[36] -that is, a dissociated state native to the traumatized actual child. As anxiety suffused the room, the analyst noted how scared Horace seemed and how it almost looked like he was using the pillows as a shield. Horace said very little, citing an inability to think and a dizzying confusion; yet we could argue that he did speak, however in a language of mimesis wherein the pillows became a mirror.

When Horace turned to his analyst, asking why he was feeling and behaving this way, his analyst said, "what about the idea that you are reliving something." This helped, for though Horace was familiar with the basic psychoanalytic concept of repetition, it ultimately eluded him in his spell of fear and anxiety. Such a spell is evocative of the soulless part of the personality for whom, Ferenczi observes, "disintegration is not perceived at all."[37] As for the event relived, Horace had no ready explanation, or at least none satisfactory, to offer. Later Horace realized that the feeling he shared with the analyst got transmuted into a conflict interpretation; a childlike hope, in other words, was contorted into a complex idea. This likely precipitated Horace's decompensation. "Whenever an emotional reaction is suppressed, interrupted, or repressed," writes Ferenczi, "something is actually destroyed in us."[38] Hope as a derivative of the actual child was

thus orphaned off, becoming another "annihilated part of the person [that] falls into a state of decay and decomposition."[39] This deeply unconscious process is only observed from without, as if from above, by the soulless, etiolate, disembodied fragment -a ghost in the room, an uncanny presence, the mutual sense that something was being repeated. In response to the threat of total annihilation, Orpha deployed a mimetic defense, which for Horace appeared in the pillows. Rather than defending from an imminent impingement, the pillows mimetically communicated to the analyst that an impingement had already occurred, leaving Horace psychically undefended from an interpellation that hailed him to identify with a concept at the expense of his affective state. A virtual "confusion of tongues,"[40] the adult-analyst's passion for knowledge trumped the child-patient's tender optimism and left Horace confused, disturbed, and yet dependent on his analyst for some understanding of what had happened.

The pillows thus commanded the analyst to give an account of his affective participation in the event, a participation inextricable from the analyst's own repressed affect or actual child, for Ferenczi's mutual or "two children" analysis is a not a unilateral deconstruction of the patient's unconscious, but "a dialogue of unconsciousnesses"[41] for which both parties must be accountable. What the analyst interpreted was a twist, a kind of topsy-turvy process in Horace's thinking: Horace was hopeful and aspiring to resolution, thereby turning what might actually be a conflict on its head. It is as if his hopefulness may have committed potentially perverse act, proffering a conflict-free, womb-like resolution by negating what might in fact be an omnipotent denial of conflict and aggression. The pillows, however, mimetically asked that the analyst account for his affective response to this perverse proposition. The pillows symbolized a thwarted need for the analyst to merge with Horace's hopefulness in order to create an integrated emotional unit, a womb-like illusion in which a once "suppressed, interrupted, or repressed"[42] affect could dwell within the analyst as well, consorting with his own repressed affects of fear and anxiety that were made apparent in the decision to interpret rather than feel-with Horace in the moment.

The suppression of affect is an actual trauma that marks the genesis of Ferenczi's social unconscious. It is through the further repression of one's spontaneous feeling, the identification with and forced adaptation to the adult's will -in other words, a sort of "resolution" of the Oedipus complex- that the tripartite organization of actual child, Orpha, and the soulless part of the personality is born. When Horace's hopefulness was dashed and he felt confused, full of self-doubt, and with no option but to turn to the analyst, identifying with him as the one who knows, he performatively embodied the origins of the social unconscious. In more Althusserian terms, the analyst's interpretation hailed Horace to assume a position of epistemic subjection, interpellating him away from putatively maternal and enigmatic affect and toward the paternal phallus as bearer of knowledge and truth. Horace thus felt rejected, powerless, dissociated. He could not protest the situation, his mind confused and concretized, his body turning to mimetic defense as a last resort.

While Ferenczi critiqued the implantation of adult eroticism as central to the subjugation of the actual child, approaching the actual child in analysis nevertheless involves erotic transference-countertransference dynamics that can trouble analyst and patient alike. Steven Kuchuck writes of his work with men abused as boys, noting the eroticism involved in the intense hunger these men have for a father figure that can psychically hold and yet penetrate them consensually.[43] Such holding can induce shared regression to the womb-like existence associated above with a queer sexuality in which the distinctiveness of objects such as genitalia is perhaps less important than the affective fluid that joins such objects together. This is akin to what Ferenczi termed a "thalassal regression",[44] a regression to and momentary restoration of the mother-sea, which, like Bataille's eroticism, destroys separate identities in a way that mimics death. Bataille's likening of shared affect to the merger of eroticism thus suggests that being-with a patient's feeling to the point of it becoming a mutually embodied state, that is, a state of interpenetration, can pose risk to identifications that form the socially recognizable self. The analyst's identification as a heterosexual male, in other words, is jeopardized when working with his queer male patient's actual child, for it requires that he invoke his own actual child, a child less concerned with genitally organized penetration than thalassal regressions and polymorphously perverse contact. Penetrating with interpretation can thus be a way to repeat the rejection of the actual child that is seeking to (e)merge in relation to the parental object. Such

repetition is likely mounted out of an anxiety of losing one's identity in the erotic undercurrents of affective contact, currents that have the power to destroy and subversively reconstitute identities constructed through interpellation.[45] This process is what the pillows, for Horace, might have mirrored so that the analyst could consider the normativizing function of interpreting rather than feeling Horace's hope.

The split between interpretation and being-with the patient returns us to the photo in which Horace is called to identify with the father-analyst's interpretation at the expense of lateral identification with his affectively queer brother. The longing for a father that does not demand such a split was enacted when Horace turned to his analyst for some explanation as to what was happening. The wished-for response, perhaps that Horace was trying to communicate something about his feelings to the analyst, was educed in the compassionately delivered notion that Horace might be reliving something. This interpretation was digestible enough to constitute a partial realization of a father that feels-with the boy, not simply as a securely attached father but a homoerotic one that can body forth, becoming libidinally invested in his son's shuddering at the sometimes confusing queerness of affective life. Such an affective meeting between analyst and patient only happens in the moment, the *il y ya* or the moment of kairos, where two children tussle under and against the aegis of the adult unconscious.

If the adult-analyst-aggressor can successfully heed to the child-patient victim's command, locating himself as an accomplice to the child's suffering, then the potential for an embodied rather than a soulless witnessing of the trauma becomes possible. One only witnesses the actual child in a temporality of the instant. Bataille refers to such temporality as the *il y ya*: "impossible, yet there it is."[46] Absent and thought to be lost to the adult, the actual child suddenly becomes affectively present, amounting to an impossible visitation of sorts, or what Bataille further defines as "the negative analogue of a miracle."[47] For Bataille, the *il y ya* is dizzying and blinding, akin to the darkness attendant upon staring into the sun. Irreducible to empirical phenomenon, the *il y ya* of the actual child is nevertheless registered phenomenologically in the form of spontaneous enactment, aptly displayed in the case of Horace. The *il y ya* is also conceivable as a form of what E.L. McCallum and Mikko Tuhkanen refer to as queer time. They note how at the end of Freud's life, he Oedipalized temporality by conflating the father with Kronos, the Greek god thought by some scholars to be the personification of time. A queer temporality, however, "is not that of *chronos*, of linear time whose very name mythically signals lineage (in the ancient Green myth, Kronos is father to Zeus); rather, the contingencies of the queer might be closer to the time of *kairos*, the moment of opportunity."[48]

CONCLUSION: THE MUTUAL AND THE ASYMMETRICAL, AN ONGOING STRUGGLE

Critics of Ferenczi's psychoanalysis have noted that the privileging of mutuality or what is discussed above as a queerly affective, two-children analysis, does not square with the inherent asymmetry of the psychoanalytic situation, or we could add, the asymmetry between child and adult. While Bataille is a thinker who similarly critiques the violent interpellation of children into the adult order,[49] he is also keen to note the importance of such order if eroticism as transgression is to maintain its riveting and pleasurable allure. For Bataille, we need shame from the traumatic indoctrination into social order so that the traversal of separate bodies, whether in affective or erotic states, is something that perennially continues to spark our desire, for shame is what we momentarily overcome in the eroto-affective act.[50] At the end of his life, Ferenczi himself encountered the inadequacy of mutual or two-children analysis, suggesting that the return to a "pre-traumatic state" can only have transient effects as opposed to any permanent psychical reorganization. A more casual reading of Ferenczi might suggest that his romantic vision did not totally grasp that certain kinds of trauma, such as the passage from childhood to adulthood, remain integral to affective life, as they constitute losses that make mourning and elation such compelling forces in human experience. But the *Clinical Diary* powerfully demonstrates Ferenczi's commitment to an engaged and interminable countervailing between child and adult, analyst and patient, so that any dedifferentiation striven for in mutual analysis does not simply negate asymmetry, but commits to struggling with it in a sort of Bataillean or Foucaultian spirit.[51]

Bernard Stiegler describes the draconian character of a globalized consumer culture that abandons its children by destroying their need to identify with adults as bearers of law and responsibility. "This repeated

identification," he notes, is "what both distinguishes and links the generations." Without such identification children suffer from another trauma, one that Ferenczi's trauma theory[52] seemingly underestimated, namely, the loss of previous generations as "transmitters of experience" beyond the traumas Ferenczi regarded to be inherent to subject formation. In other words, it is as if Ferenczi's mutual analysis never reached the point of turning the soulless ghost of the mind into an actively witnessing ancestor because his metapsychology implicitly viewed identity itself -the very categories of generations- to be a trauma and an impingement. But again, we must ask to what extent Ferenczi never ceased struggling with identity, mimetically defending against and deconstructing it, rather than proposing we do away with it *en toto*.

Horace's indirect criticism, his proverbial grimace, formerly manifest in the self-harm of drug abuse, slowly entered into the analysis, first in the form of mimesis with the pillows and later in a verbal request that the analyst account for his participation in the enactment. However, it was the analyst's openness to reparation, rather than simply avoiding a similar enactment in the future, which laid the ground for more direct criticism. Moreover, it was the analyst's openness in general, or what Ferenczi terms "maternal friendliness,"[53] that appealed to Orpha, engendering *kairos* or the *il y ya*, and that allowed for the impossible appearance of the actual child that had been spurned by an adult from Horace's largely immemorial past. Ferenczi is of two minds about such a movement. On one hand, he espouses a non-teleological process of rupture and repair as curative; on the other, he idealizes the return to a pre-traumatic state, unwittingly turning it into a possible *telos* in the form of an impossible return to the womb. This is the implicit paradox of Ferenczi's late work: one might want to destroy the adult-analyst altogether, returning to an undifferentiated state of the womb, but what makes the restoration (rather than the return) to this state an appealing possibility, is precisely its impossibility as a permanent solution. Continually grappling with this impossibility was the purpose of Ferenczi's mutual analysis. It was also the purpose of the mirror as a defense, a mimetic defense, bracing the actual, queer child for a time of emergence that does not reflect the self in its interpellation, but in its otherness as an affective truth languishing and deteriorating in the social unconscious, a child's truth timelessly still and yet not without the potential for being witnessed in the moment of an affect, blinding like the sun.

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Volver a Newsletter 21-ALSF

Notas al final

1.- Sandor Ferenczi, “Child Analysis in the Analysis of Adults,” in Final Contributions on the Problems and Methods of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Eric Mosbacher and ed. Michael Balint (London: Karnac, 2002), 127.
2.- Sandor Ferenczi, Clinical Diary, trans. Michael Balint and Nicola Zarday Jackson and ed. Judith Dupont (Boston: Harvard UP, 1989), 8.
3.- Ferenczi, Clinical Diary, 69.
4.- E.L. McCallum and Mikko Tukhanen, “Becoming Unbecoming: Untimely Meditations” in Queer Times, Queer Becomings. eds. E.L. McCallum and Mikko Tukhanen (New York: SUNY P, 2011), 8–9.
5.- Kathryn Bond-Stockton, The Queer Child, or Growing Sideway in the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke UP, 2009).
6.- Sandor Ferenczi, Clinical Diary, trans. Michael Balint and Nicola Zarday Jackson and ed. Judith Dupont (Boston: Harvard UP, 1989), 177.
7.- See Carlo Bonomi, “The Penis on the Trail: Re-Reading the Origins of Psychoanalysis With Sandor Ferenczi,” in The Legacy of Sandor Ferenczi: From Ghost to Ancestor, eds. Adrienne Harris and Steven Kuchuck (New York: Routledge, 2015), 33–52.
8.- Bonomi, “The Penis,” 40.
9.- Emil Cioran, The Trouble With Being Born, trans. Richard Howard and ed. Eugene Thacker (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2012)
10.- Ferenczi, Clinical Diary, 69.
11.- Max Cavitch, “Do You Love Me? The Question of the Queer Child of Psychoanalysis,” in Psychoanalysis, Culture, & Society 5/9 (2015): 1–19.
12.- Georges Bataille, Erotism: Death and Sensuality, trans. Mary Dalwood (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1986), 29.
13.- Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share Vol. 3: Sovereignty, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 242.
14.- Bonomi, “The Penis,” 40.
15.- Sigmund Freud, “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” 225.
16.- Dominique Scarfone, The Unpast, Actuality of the Unconscious (New York: Unconscious in Translation, 2016), 34.
17.- Ferenczi, Clinical Diary, 9; emphasis added.
18.- Ibid.; emphasis in original.
19.- Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1950).
20.- Ferenczi, Clinical Diary, 8–10.
21.- Ibid., 182.
22.- Sandor Ferenczi, “Confusion of Tongues Between the Adults and the Child: The Language of Tenderness and Passion,” in Final Contributions on the Problems and Methods of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Eric Mosbacher and ed. Michael Balint (London: Karnac, 2002), 163–64.
23.- Althusser, Louis. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review P, 2001).
24.- Ferenczi, Clinical Diary, 9.
25.- Ibid.
26.- Sandor Ferenczi. “The Elasticity of Psychoanalytic Technique,” in Final Contributions on the Problems and Methods of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Eric Mosbacher and ed. Michael Balint (London: Karnac, 2002), 89.
27.- Ferenczi, Clinical Diary, 8.
28.- Hayuta Gurevich. “The Language of Absence and the Language of Tenderness: Therapeutic Transformation of Early Psychic Trauma and Dissociation as Resolution of ‘Identification With the Aggressor,’” Fort Da: the Journal of the Northern California Society for Psychoanalytic Psychology 21, no. 1 (2015): 52.
29.- Ferenczi, Clinical Diary, 9.
30.- This parallels Judith Butler’s view of imitation. See her “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” in The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, eds. Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale and David M. Halperin (London: Routledge, 1993), 307–20.
31.- Leo Bersani. “Is the Rectum a Grave?” in Is the Rectum a Grave and Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago P, 2010), 30.
32.- Sandor Ferenczi, Clinical Diary, 50.
33.- Ibid.
34.- Michael Balint quoted in Tom Keve, “Ferenczi Remembered,” in Ferenczi and His World: Rekindling the Spirit of the Budapest School, eds. Judit Szekacs-Weisz and Tom Keve (London: Karnac, 2012), 19.
35.- Anne Alvarez, “Beyond the Unpleasure Principle: Some Preconditions for Thinking Through Play,” Journal of Child Psychotherapy 14 (1988): 4.
36.- Ferenczi, “Child Analysis,” 130.
37.- Ferenczi, Clinical Diary, 9.
38.- Ibid., 88
39.- Ibid.
40.- Ibid
41.- Ibid., 84.
42.- Ibid., 88.

43.- Steven Kuchuck, “On the Therapeutic Action of Love and Desire,” in The Legacy of Sandor Ferenczi: From Ghost to Ancestor, eds. Adrienne Harris and Steven Kuchuck (New York: Routledge, 2015).
44.- Sandor Ferenczi, Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality, trans. Henry Alden Bunker (London: Karnac, 1989).
45.- Avgi Saketopolou, “To Suffer Pleasure: The Shattering of the Ego as the Labor of Perverse Sexuality,” Studies in Gender and Sexuality 15 (2014): 254–68.
46.- Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, 243.
47.- Ibid.
48.- McCallum and Tuhkanen, “Introduction,” 8.
49.- Bataille, The Accursed Share, 63.
50.- Ruth Stein, “The Otherness of Sexuality: Excess,” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 56 (2008): 43–71.
51.- Max Cavitch discusses the Foucaultian version of such a spirit in his “Do You Love Me? The Question of the Queer Child of Psychoanalysis,” in Psychoanalysis, Culture, & Society 5/9 (2015): 1–19.
52.- Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (California: Stanford UP, 2010), 4.
53.- Ferenczi, “Confusion of Tongues,” 160.