

VIOLENCE, TRAUMA, AND HYPOCRISY.

Ferenc Erős (*)

ABSTRACT.

The article explores how Ferenczi addressed violence in its interpersonal, familial, therapeutic, and social manifestations, considering them inseparable in their structure and traumatogenic function. It describes how violence is not an isolated act but a process with consequences such as the concealment of the violent act and the breakdown of trust in one's senses. Ferenczi also critiques professional hypocrisy in therapeutic and social contexts, linking it to excessive repression and authoritarian practices. He proposes social transformation based on the sublimation of instincts rather than repression, emphasizing the concept of "individual collectivism." Finally, he analyzes how collective violence during war reflects phylogenetic traumatic patterns, connecting this to his utopian philosophy and the anticipation of welfare state policies.

Keywords: Violence, trauma, hypocrisy, psychoanalysis, Ferenczi, repression, collectivism, social welfare

RESUMEN.

El artículo explora cómo Ferenczi abordó la violencia en sus manifestaciones interpersonal, familiar, terapéutica y social, considerándolas inseparables en su estructura y función traumatogénica. Describe cómo la violencia no es un acto aislado, sino un proceso con consecuencias como la ocultación del acto violento y el quiebre de la confianza en los propios sentidos. Ferenczi también critica la hipocresía profesional en el ámbito terapéutico y social, relacionándola con la represión excesiva y las prácticas autoritarias. Propone una transformación social basada en la sublimación de los instintos en lugar de la represión, destacando el concepto de "colectivismo individual." Finalmente, analiza cómo la violencia colectiva durante la guerra refleja patrones traumáticos filogenéticos, lo que conecta con su filosofía utópica y la anticipación de políticas de bienestar social.

Palabras clave: Violencia, trauma, hipocresía, psicoanálisis, Ferenczi, represión, colectivismo, bienestar social.

Violence is one of the central themes in Ferenczi's work. Violence can be interpersonal, familial, therapeutic, and social —Ferenczi treats these different aspects simultaneously since he considers them as inseparable from each other, with regard to their structure as well as their traumatogenic function. Violence is not a single act but a series of events, which includes its antecedents as well as its consequences. One consequence of a violent act may be the complete annulment or concealment of the act itself. As Ferenczi describes this process in his emblematic article "Confusion of Tongues between the Adults and the Child":

When the child recovers from such an attack [the trauma], he feels enormously confused, in fact, split —innocent and culpable at the same time— and his confidence in the testimony in his own senses is broken. Moreover, the harsh behaviour of the adult partner tormented and made angry by his remorse renders the child still more conscious of his own guilt and still more ashamed. Almost always the perpetrator behaves as though nothing had happened, and consoles himself with the thought: "Oh it is only a child, he does not know anything, he will forget it all." Not infrequently after such events, the seducer becomes over-moralistic or religious, and endeavours to save the soul of the child by severity. (Ferenczi [1933] 1999, 299)

In the same article, Ferenczi also speaks about a “hypocrisy hitherto regarded as impossible,” that is, professional hypocrisy (Ferenczi [1933] 1999, 295). Professional hypocrisy is a main concern for Ferenczi in the *Clinical Diary*, too. For example, he writes, “Patients feel the hypocritical element in the analyst’s behaviour” (Ferenczi [1932] 1988, 200), or “Hatred of patients is behind the hypocritical friendliness of the doctor toward the patients” (201). He recognizes a similar hypocrisy, an endeavor “to save the soul of the child by severity,” on the part of educators, teachers, and parents as well, who are “pregnant with rage that is disguised in benevolent behaviour” (167). In the *Diary*, Ferenczi regards benevolence, or “excessive goodness,” as a manifestation of the overcompensated sadism of obsessional neurotics.

The negativity of “goodness,” “fairness,” or “benevolence,” which are masks concealing a trauma, was also a topic for Erich Fromm, who, in his essay on “The Social Determinants of Psychoanalytic Therapy,” speaks about the apparent tolerance of the therapist, which is, in fact, the concealment of “doctors’ hidden sadism” (Fromm [1935] 2000, 160–61). As Lacan put it even more provocatively in his essay on “the mirror stage”: “we can find no promise in altruistic feeling, we who lay bare the aggressiveness that underlies the activity of the philanthropist, the idealist, the pedagogue, and even the reformer” (Lacan 2006, 80–81). Concerning “goodness” as an ethico-philosophical category, I am referencing György Lukács, who, in his 1911 dialogical essay “On Poverty of Spirit,” points to Prince Mishkin, the hero of Dostoyevsky’s *Idiot*, whose “goodness” is unproductive, confusing, and unintentionally sows tragedy (Lukács 1911).

But let us go back to Ferenczi. On a more general level, for him, society as a whole “under the prevalent regime” is hypocritical. The benevolent surface or skin barely conceals what he calls in the *Clinical Diary*, “the terrorism of suffering,” of which we are all victims because of repressive and authoritarian child-rearing practices and “the passionate behaviour of adults” (Ferenczi [1932] 1988, 200). The consequence of these is mysticism, religiosity, defense against sexual impulses, and authoritarianism, as Fromm and Wilhelm Reich demonstrated in the very same epoch in which Ferenczi lived.

It is tempting to simply use Ferenczi’s growing alienation from and his traumatic breach with Freud in the late twenties as the explanation for his passionate rage against hypocrisy. However, the critique of social and educational hypocrisy was one of his main concerns *from the very beginning* of his psychoanalytic career in 1908. Hypocrisy, in Hungarian, “*képmutatás*”, literally “showing an image,” may have been an everyday experience for the citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The hypocrisy of the life-world of the Monarchy was perhaps best characterized by the Austrian writer Robert Musil in his most significant novel *The Man without Qualities*:

[This country] by its constitution . . . was liberal, but its system of government was clerical. The system of government was clerical, but the general attitude to life was liberal. Before the law all citizens were equal, but not everyone, of course, was a citizen. There was a parliament, which made such vigorous use of its liberty that it was usually kept shut; but there was an emergency powers act by means it was possible to manage without parliament. (Musil [1930] 1979, 33)

Ferenczi focused on the *human side* of this hypocrisy. As he wrote in his first psychoanalytical contribution, the paper he gave at the First International Congress of Psychoanalysis in Salzburg entitled “Psychoanalysis and Education”: “Only when the hypocritical mysteriousness in sexual matters has ceased to exist, when everyone will know of the processes of his own body and mind —i.e., only with conscious cathexis— will sexual emotions be truly mastered and sublimated” (Ferenczi [1908] 1994, 285–86). In his letter to Freud on February 5, 1910, he affirmed: “Once society has gone beyond the infantile, then hitherto completely unimagined possibilities for social and political life are opened up. Just think what it would mean if one could tell everyone the truth, one’s father, teacher, neighbour, and even the king. All fabricated, imposed authority will go to the devil” (Freud and Ferenczi 1908–1914, 130).

The key concepts of these earlier works are the notions of “unnecessary compulsion” and “excessive repression.” Repression in contemporary society, Ferenczi argues, demands not only a minimum of instinctual renunciation that the already sufficiently demanding external circumstances require, but also the

subjugation of its members, the deprivation of their freedom, human dignity, and autonomy. “Excessive repression,” speculates Ferenczi, sets free those instinctual forces that lead to religious superstition, the cult of authority, and a rigid adherence to obsolete social forms. In “Psychoanalysis and Education,” he argues:

“Liberation from unnecessary inner compulsion would be the first revolution to bring real relief to mankind, for political revolutions have achieved only that the external powers, that is, the means of coercion, have changed hands, or that the number of the oppressed has risen or fallen. Only people liberated in this real sense will be able to bring about a radical change in education and prevent permanently the return of similar undesirable circumstances.” (Ferenczi [1908] 1994, 283)

Ferenczi, as a social critic, maintained a strong link to progressivist and intellectual movements of his age, like the Galileo Circle and other groupings of young scholars and students in Budapest during the ‘fin-de-siècle’ and pre-war periods. These were groups whose members were devoted to the most various innovative, exciting ideas, reforms, and revolutionary dreams.¹ Ferenczi, as a “reform-utopian,” envisioned a future society in which natural urges and desires would be treated not with negation and repression, but with a “sound government” that would replace hypocrisy and the blind adoration of dogma and authority (Ferenczi 1911). In an article on “Psychoanalysis and Its Judicial and Sociological Relevance,” he affirms that: “Between anarchy and communism . . . , between unrestrained individual license and social asceticism, there must be somewhere a reasonable individual-socialistic just milieu that cares also for individual welfare as well as for the interests of society, that cultivates the sublimation instead of the repression of instincts, thereby preparing a quiet path for progress assured from revolutions and reactions” (Ferenczi [1913a] 1994, 433).

Ferenczi’s focus was, however, not only on society as such, but on the process of its reproduction: the child, the infantile, on both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels. His fundamental essay “Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality” ([1913b] 1999) describes the structural trauma of the individual and the collective, the trauma of birth, the “same cruel game repeated with every new stage of development” (80), the violent renunciation of omnipotence, and the splitting of the ego through projection and introjection. In this work, Ferenczi already linked “the great step in our individual repression, the latency period,” with “the last and greatest that befell our ancestors . . . with the misery of the ice age, which we still faithfully recapitulate in our individual life” (80). This very Lamarckian idea was further elaborated during World War I (as his correspondence with Freud shows) and then in his work *Catastrophes in the History of Sexuality*, also known as *Thalassa*, published in 1924 (Ferenczi [1924] 2005). It was the Great War that first initiated Ferenczi into the reality of massive social and collective violence, where each participant has their own history of personal trauma. In an article published in 1915 under the title “The Ice-Age of Catastrophes,” he wrote:

The worst and most upsetting events could appear as unbridled experiences of experimental psychology, a kind of “Naturexperiment” that the scientist cannot realize in his study, but at most, within the laboratory of his mind. War is one of those laboratory experiments taken to a cosmic level. In peacetime, only through the complex examination of dreams, of neurotic symptoms, of artistic creations, of diverse religions can one demonstrate . . . that the human psyche presents multiple layers, the culture is but a prettily decorated shop window whilst at the back of the store the more primitive merchandise is piled up. War had brutally wrested off this mask and has shown us man in his deepest, truest nature at the heart of man, the child, the savage, the primitive. . . . It is in this way that the catastrophes of the ice age have forged long ago in the first familial and religious society, the basis of all subsequent evolution. War has simply thrown us back into the ice age, or rather, it has unveiled the deep imprints that it had left in the psychic universe of humanity. (Ferenczi [1915] 1999, 125)

The personal impact of the “ice age of catastrophes” arrived on Ferenczi’s doorstep shortly after the outbreak of the war, in October 1914, when he was ordered to join as a “volunteer” physician for the 7th Royal Hussar Regiment stationed in Pápa, a small garrison town in Western Hungary. In early 1916, he was ordered to return to Budapest, where he was in charge of a section for nervous diseases in the “Mária Valéria” barrack hospital. As we know from his letters, he had been writing to Freud at the same time he started working with cases of traumatic neuroses. These cases might be one of the sources for what he wrote about later in *Clinical Diary*: “What is traumatic, is the unforeseen, the unfathomable, the incalculable. *If I kill myself, I know what will happen. Suicide is less traumatic (not unforeseen)*” (Ferenczi [1932] 1988, 171).

In his article “Two Types of War Neuroses” ([1916] 1999), Ferenczi discusses his psychoanalytic conception of the genesis of traumatic neuroses, based on Freud’s concept of hysteria, for the first time in detail. According to him, the shell-shocked patients’ symptoms (tremors of the feet or full-body musculature, gait disorders, spastic paresis, cramps, hyperesthesia, etc.) had all been caused by psychic trauma and not by central lesions of the nervous system as was widely believed by many contemporary neurologists. Observing patients suffering from *astasia* (inability to stand) and *abasia* (inability to walk), Ferenczi thought that these patients:

... had repressed into their unconscious the affective reaction to certain psychic traumata, for the most part experiences that were adapted to *diminish* their self-confidence, repressed in the unconscious from where they continued to influence their activities, and any threat of repetition of the pathogenic experience led to a development of anxiety. The patient then learns to escape anxiety states by avoiding any activity that would in any way lead to the repetition of the pathogenic situation. (*hysterical anxiety*). (Ferenczi [1916] 1999, 137–38)

Coordination disturbances like tremors “[become] a defense formation that will protect the patient from re-experiencing the alarm” (Ferenczi [1916] 1999, 141). In other cases, like hyperesthesia (hypersensitivity of all the senses), “the psyche does not wait for an external stimulus in order to react to it exaggeratedly, but creates for itself the image at which it can then become alarmed. The unpleasant symptom too, therefore, is in the service of the effort of self-healing. (Traumatophilia)” (Ferenczi [1916] 1999, 143).

According to Ferenczi, the psychoanalytic observation of shell-shocked patients proves Freud’s original hypothesis about the predominantly sexual aetiology of hysteria, inasmuch as many patients behave as if they are victims of childhood sexual assault. The result of psychic shocks, argues Ferenczi, may be a neurotic regression, that is, “a return to a stage of development long outgrown both onto- and phylogenetically” (Ferenczi [1916] 1999, 40). At the end of his article, Ferenczi refers to “the result achieved by many neurologists from treating war neuroses by painful electric stimuli” that may be due “to the fact these painful sensations satisfy the patient’s latent traumatophilia” (Ferenczi [1916] 1999, 144).

Space does not allow me to go into details about treatment with electric stimuli. It is enough to say that electroshock therapy was, in fact, a disguised form of bodily torture in order to elicit obedience and to discipline and punish (in a Foucauldian sense) soldiers who protested against the horrors of war by producing psychic symptoms. Electroshock therapy was also called the “surprise cure,” assuming that the great and sudden pain caused by the shock would make the patient “forget” his symptoms forever. War neurotics had been stigmatized with malingering, feminine and infantile features, moral inferiority, cowardice, lack of will, and lack of patriotism. It was supposed and feared that this kind of “male hysteria” might also infect “healthy” soldiers, destroying their will, determination, patriotism, and heroism. Therefore, hysterics were to be healed using the harshest methods, and incurable degenerates, schizophrenics, and mentally handicapped persons were to be isolated from the rest of their compatriots. The famous German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (who first described the symptoms of schizophrenia as “dementia praecox”) declared that the defeat of Germany was caused not primarily by the armies of the enemy, but by “psychopathic revolutionaries” who spread mass hysteria and pacifism among the population. Psychiatry and psychopathology had become an

important part of the war propaganda machine, stigmatizing both inner and outer enemies with pathological character traits (femininity, aggression, etc.). For example, some German psychiatrists used the strange diagnostic term “psychopathia gallica” to signify the alleged “femininity” of the national character of the French enemy.²

In Hungary, a military physician named Dr. Viktor Gonda was one of the most well-known practitioners of electrotherapy. His methods and activities were noticed by the military-medical authorities throughout the Monarchy and also by the wider public. Ferenczi, as we know from his correspondence with Freud, had become acquainted with him in 1917 at a military psychiatric ward in Budapest. On October 10, 1917, he reported to Freud: “[Dr. Gonda] is spreading himself around more and more here, is having column-length articles written about his miracle cures (in daily newspapers), and all the naive folk, from archduke to university professor on down, are coming to our hospital to observe the miracle together” (Freud and Ferenczi 1996, 243). In another letter to Freud on December 13, he called Gonda a “half-crazy half-swindler.” He went on, “No matter how skillfully he carries out his suggestion cures, his ignorance and his megalomania were becoming well-nigh unbearable to me” (ibid.). I do not know if Gonda was really a swindler or if he truly believed that electrotherapy could genuinely alleviate the symptoms of shell shock, not so much with the physical impact of the shocks, but with his own suggestive power. But it was, in any case, hypocrisy, or “showing an image.” In fact, images of treatment appear to be a theatrical performance that may bring to mind Charcot’s “theatre of hysteria.”

But the séance continued. Immediately before the end of the war, on September 28–29, 1918, the Fifth International Congress of Psychoanalysis took place in Budapest. The congress, dominated by the discussion of war neurosis, was only nominally “international” since most participants came from Austria-Hungary and Germany, that is, powers on the brink of their final defeat. Paradoxically, however, the congress was a grand victory for Ferenczi, who succeeded in persuading military health authorities to represent themselves at the congress. Far beyond its professional significance, the Budapest congress became a celebrated public event mainly due to Ferenczi’s determined efforts and his strong connections to the Budapest intellectual elite; it was a “performance” for the capital, and the opening session boasted several notable attendees. The congress seemed to reconfirm Freud’s earlier vision of Budapest as “the headquarters of our movement” (Freud and Abraham 2002, 382). Moreover, in an order issued a few days after the congress by the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of War, military health authorities accepted, in principle, the idea that psychoanalysis might be attempted as a final treatment method in such cases of traumatic neuroses where patients had already shown resistance to other methods.³ It was, of course, a Pyrrhic victory, since the war was not only lost but the Dual Monarchy disintegrated within a few weeks. In October, revolutions broke out in both Vienna and Budapest.

In the turbulent autumn of 1918, hundreds of medical students petitioned the new democratic government led by Count Mihály Károlyi to invite Ferenczi to teach psychoanalysis at the University of Budapest. The university, however, resisted, and Ferenczi’s university assignment only became a reality months later, under the government of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, led by Béla Kun, which came to power on April 1, 1919. Ferenczi accepted a professorship as compensation for the earlier neglect of the communist regime, which he was far from enthusiastically supporting. Although he somewhat sympathized with the plans of the government regarding the reform of public health and medical education, he felt threatened by the plans of the regime to nationalize the whole health system and to deprive doctors of their private practice as the basis of their (including Ferenczi’s) existence.⁴

After the defeat of the first Hungarian communist regime on August 1, 1919, Ferenczi was among those professors who were immediately dismissed from their positions. A year later, he was also barred from the Budapest Royal Medical Association. The whole situation is best characterized in his letter to Freud on August 28, 1919:

After the unbearable “Red terror,” which lay heavily on one’s spirit like a nightmare, we now have the White one. For a short time, it seemed as if they would succeed in moderating the parties toward a just

compromise, but in the end, the ruthless clerical-anti-Semitic spirit seems to have eked out a victory. If everything does not deceive, we Hungarian Jews are now facing a period of brutal persecution of Jews. They will, I think, have cured us in a very short time of the illusion with which we were brought up, namely, that we are “Hungarians of Jewish faith.” I picture Hungarian anti-Semitism—commensurate with the national character—to be more brutal than the petty-hateful type of the Austrians. It will very soon become evident how one can live and work here. It is naturally the best thing for $\Psi\alpha$ to continue working in complete withdrawal and without a sound. Personally, one will have to take this trauma as an occasion to abandon certain prejudices brought along from the nursery and to come to terms with the bitter truth of being, as a Jew, really without a country. (Freud and Ferenczi 1996, 365)

After the trauma of the failure of both revolutions and in the atmosphere of severe repressions, Ferenczi felt himself in a vacuum both politically and professionally. In these circumstances, he became acquainted with a young man, Aurél Kolnai (1900–1973), who later became known primarily as a political scientist and a conservative moral philosopher in the West. Kolnai studied social sciences in Budapest and Vienna, was a member of the Galileo Circle, and was, for a short time, intellectually committed to psychoanalysis, although he became an ardent critic a few years later.⁵ In early 1920, he joined the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Society and gave there a lecture under the title “Psychoanalysis and Sociology.” It was also the title of the book Kolnai published the same year in Vienna at the International Psychoanalytic Publishing House (Kolnai [1920] 2013). This work was basically a pamphlet against Russian Bolshevism, written in connection with the failed revolutionary movements in Central Europe. Kolnai saw revolution as a mass psychological phenomenon, the manifestation of an oedipal revolt of the tribal brothers against the domination of the father that only leads to the even more repressive domination of tyrannical leaders or “substitute fathers.” Kolnai’s arguments could have provided inspiration for Sigmund Freud, whose major work on mass psychology was published a year later (Freud 1921). Kolnai’s book also played an important role in Marxist debates on psychoanalysis in the twenties, since it became a scapegoat, “an ideological phantom,” a favorite example of how Freudianism was a particularly dangerous branch of bourgeois ideology.

Kolnai was particularly critical of what he called “anarcho-communism,” and he advocated “liberal socialism” as an antidote for anarchistic degenerations. There are two brief, recently published manuscripts of Ferenczi entitled “Parallels between Marxism, Communism, and Anarchism” and “Parallels between Psychoanalysis and Liberal Socialism.” Both manuscripts belong to the Ferenczi estate, which was donated to the London Freud Museum by Dr. Judith Dupont a few years ago. These texts reflect Kolnai’s views.⁶

In ‘Manuscript I’, Ferenczi raises the issue of parallels between psychoanalysis and the Marxist concept of history. He comes to the conclusion that this parallel is unsatisfactory since the goals of the two schools are basically different. He associates Marxism with “rigid dialectics” and rejects its alleged economic determinism as well as the concept of “class struggle,” instead arguing that for psychoanalysis, the *homo infans* rather than the *homo oeconomicus* is the basic structure. He contrasts the Darwinian “selectionism” attributed to Marxism with Lamarckian evolutionism. In fact, Ferenczi’s critique is directed not only against Marxism but also against a so-called “psychoanalytic mentality” that “is almost equivalent with an anarcho-communist mentality,” which dreams of the elimination of all repressions, the satisfaction of all desires, and envisages a “fatherless society” as the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis. Ferenczi contrasts this kind of “wild” mentality with “the healthy stock” of psychoanalysis, the aim of which is not the “liberation of instincts,” but rather “an instrument for the self-liberation of personality.” Finally, Ferenczi acknowledges that “a certain historical innovative role, an experiment for a new, more deeply penetrating, more scientific approach to things” is common in both movements. However, “psychoanalysis rather joins Durkheim and not the Marxist sociology and politics, and, in concrete and actual questions, joins liberal socialism.”

In ‘Manuscript II’, Ferenczi further elaborates his ideas on a possible parallel between psychoanalysis and liberal socialism. He argues that while the parallel with Marxism failed, “psychoanalysis and liberal socialism share the same worldview, the same ethical sense, and the same task in the service of the welfare

of men.” Psychoanalysis, as he argues, cannot bring “salvation,” but only works “on the self-salvation of the individual.” Discussing some basic themes of liberal socialism, Ferenczi points out the discovery of the significance of land, attributing the main responsibility for all social diseases to two conditions. The first is an “antirational, rigid fixation to the land, which resists industrialism,” and the second is “the treatment of land as a simple commodity.” As for the fixation on land, Ferenczi finds a psychoanalytic parallel for it in “land eroticism,” and in “an incestuous fixation to the mother, which inhibits free consciousness and supports the primary despotism of the father.” On the other hand, argues Ferenczi, “the treatment of land as a simple commodity would be equivalent with a helpless repression, which is incapable of higher developments.”

The idea of liberal or individual socialism reappeared in an article entitled “Psychoanalysis and Social Politics” (Ferenczi [1922] 1999). In this article, he expresses his hopes that “time will allow for the development of an ‘individual-socialist’ orientation which would take into account the natural differences between individuals, of their aspiration to independence and happiness, whilst acknowledging the need for communal life, and the restrictions, at times difficult to bear, which it imposes” (Ferenczi [1922] 1999, 211). In the article, he also explains his motives for accepting a professorial position during the communist government in 1919, affirming, “psychoanalysis has refused to perceive any political party, be it individualistic or collectivistic, as the representative of true human nature” (212).

In the 1920s, Ferenczi seemed to sink into the “thalassic regression,” that is, the prehistoric catastrophes preceding the ice age of phylogenetic and ontogenetic traumata. There is no space here to unpack my idea that Ferenczi’s *Thalassa* can be reinterpreted as a political philosophy of catastrophes. I can only refer here to the book of the French philosopher Catherine Malabou’s *Ontology of the Accident*, where she claims, “the history of being itself consists perhaps of nothing but a series of accidents which, in every era and without hope of return, dangerously disfigure the meaning of essence” (Malabou 2009, 91).

Shortly before his death, Ferenczi returned to his earlier ideas on “individual collectivism” in the ‘Clinical Diary’. Even if there is no salvation for the individual faced with trauma, terror, and death, Ferenczi foresees improvements and progress for humanity based on a “successful interaction of egoistic and universal tendencies” (Ferenczi [1932] 1998, 18). In another place in the *Diary* he writes:

If one were not ashamed to indulge in prophecies, then one would expect from the future neither the triumph of one-sided ruthless capitalism nor that of fanciful egalitarianism, but rather a full recognition of the existence of purely selfish drives, which remain under control but must be partly satisfied in reality; the elimination of a great deal of neurotic, still passionate, one might even say violently excessive goodness (eat-bird-or-die policy), and, finally, perhaps the gradual unfolding of a naïve good-heartedness. (Ferenczi [1932] 1998, 152)

This was, of course, a naïve and utopian idea that appeared in the shadow of Stalinism and the menacing victory of Nazism in Germany in 1933, the year of Ferenczi’s death.⁷ It might also be regarded as the anticipation of the social policy of the modern welfare state, which attempts to balance “ruthless capitalism” and “fanciful egalitarianism.”

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(*) Ferenc Erős (1946–2020) was a prominent social psychologist, historian of psychoanalysis, and Hungarian scholar. A Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, he was Professor Emeritus and head of the doctoral program “Theoretical Psychoanalysis” at the Doctoral School of Psychology, Faculty of Humanities, University of Pécs, Hungary. He made significant contributions to the study of psychoanalysis as editor of the Hungarian translation of the Freud-Ferenczi Correspondence (2000–2005) and as co-editor, along with J. Szekacs-Weisz and K. Robinson, of Sándor Ferenczi-Ernest Jones: Letters 1911–1933 (London: Karnac, 2013). His work focused on the reception of psychoanalysis in Hungary, the relationship between psychoanalysis and politics, and the legacy of the Budapest School. He was a key figure in the revitalization of the psychoanalytic tradition in Hungary.

Note: A shorter version of this paper was published under the title “Against Violence: Ferenczi and Liberal Socialism” (Erős 2018).

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Notas al final

- 1.- See also Erős (2012b).
- 2.- On the treatment of war neurotics during World War I, see Erős 2010
- 3.- For more on the history of the congress and its aftermath, see Erős and Giampieri 1987; Erős 2010 and 2012a.
- 4.- See more details in Erős 2012a, 2019 and Erős and Giampieri 1987.
- 5.- See also Kolnai's autobiography (1999).
- 6.- See more details and the full text of the manuscripts in Erős 2014.
- 7.- On Ferenczi's utopianism, see Berman 2003.